(2)The enigma of the problem of
cognition (excerpt)
Firstly, I would like to sketch the
problematic set-up by Husserl along with the description of ‘The Idea of Phenomenology’
(1) Traditionally, philosophy has an enigma
of ‘the impossibility of the agreement of subject-object’, namely ‘the enigma
of the problem of cognition’. However,
since natural science and modern positivistic sciences which bases on the
former presuppose ‘the agreement of subject-object’, they don’t take the
problem into account from the outset.
(2)’The enigma of
the problem of cognition’ has long been proposed by the relativist＝skeptic. Philosophy which tries to defend the objectivity and universality
of cognition, has intended to solve the problem in vain. Consequently,
this problem still remains unsolved. And that situation also sustains a
strong tendency of relativism in contemporary sciences.
(3) As long as the
science of natural thinking cannot solve the problem, philosophical
thinking has to solve the problem and only the method of phenomenology can
solve it.
Skepticism doubts all of the basic grounds
of cognition. However, it is not that any knowledge cannot hold true, objective
knowledge is in fact established in the field of natural science. Consequently,
we should rather make an essential consideration about why such an enigma
arises. Thus, Husserl provides the following tasks.
Firstly, in order to elucidate the enigma of the problem of cognition we
have to establish an essential science of ‘the criticism of cognition.
However, as cognition in the sciences of the natural kind cannot be valid
at all here, we should set up firmly the method of phenomenology.
Secondly, the elucidation of the enigma of the agreement of subject-object
must be made in the form of a decisive refutation against the contention
of skepticism that all grounds of knowledge are doubtful.
Thirdly,
to do that we should take over the method of Descartes; the setting up of ‘the
primal cognition’, namely, of the realm of absolutely assured cognition’.
According to Husserl, the realm of
absolutely indubitable ‘primal cognition’ will be assured when we once exclude
the schema of ‘subject-object’, and instead put forth that of ‘immanence-transcendence’.
Through phenomenological reflection into ‘immanent consciousness’, we can
settle an indubitable element in terms of ‘absolute givenness’.
However, not just in ‘Ideas’ but in the main works after ‘Ideas’, the meaning of the schema of ‘immanence-transcendence’ by Husserl is not quite clear. That is one of the main reasons for causing various different theories about the interpretation of phenomenology.
There are two points.
One is that Husserl succeeded the way of
Descartes’ ‘cogito’ in elucidating the problem of cognition. That causes the
suspicion that phenomenology repeats the solipsistic consciousness-ism. Another
is the strong hue of ‘the doctrine of grounding’. This also brings about doubt
and criticism that phenomenology aims at the traditional truism and the
possibility of strict cognition.
However, from our standpoint, no matter how these criticisms might be plausible, we have to say that Husserl’s elucidation of ‘the enigma of the problem of cognition’ is completely valid. So, in order to verify that, we should first confirm the basic skeleton of the problem of cognition and next examine the essential schema of phenomenological method by Husserl.
(3) Overcoming the ‘belief conflict’ (excerpt)
We must answer the following two
fundamental questions in order to verify the possibility of phenomenology.
Firstly, isn’t Husserl’s attempt to
determine ‘the realm of indubitability,’ which was succeeded from the Cartesian
way, a ‘truistic’ project of ‘the strict doctrine of grounding?”
Secondly, what is the essence of the new
cognitive schema of ‘immanence- transcendence’, which was put forth by Husserl
who abandoned the traditional schema of ‘subject-object’ in order to negate the
past attempts of grasping the absolute truth?
In modern philosophy, ‘the
enigma of the problem of cognition’ was submitted by Descartes as the thesis of
‘the impossibility of the agreement of subject-object.’ It means the skeptical
aporia, saying “There cannot be correct cognition.” After Descartes, Spinoza
represented the metaphysical dogmatism in terms of the world knowledge, and
Hume represented the strong skeptical empiricism as the antithesis of Spinoza.
It was Kant who tried to overcome ‘the enigma of epistemology’ by creating
the essential theory of cognition. He tried to lay the basis of the distinction
between the realm of the possibility and the impossibility of the cognition
by putting forth the idea of ‘thing-in-itself.’ However, his epistemology
has a residuum of the theistic worldview in Europe so it could not thoroughly
resolve the problem. Since then, this problem had remained in the field
of positivism, idealism, and skepticism as an insoluble aporia.
However, the need and necessity of elucidating ‘the enigma of the
problem of cognition’ is not clear and persuasive enough from Husserl’s
description. So I would like to sort out the problem with due considerations to
Husserl’s motives.
The task of elucidating ‘the enigma of the
problem of cognition’ has a determinably significant range not only for
philosophical theme but also for human intelligence. We can sort out the
possibility of Husserl’s phenomenology into the following two tasks.
(1) The task for
overcoming the ‘belief conflict.’
(2) The task for
creating the ‘science of essence’ (universal philosophy for the meanings).
Modern Europe had two big belief conflicts as important moments for philosophy.
One is the conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism, and it became
the critical reason for the appearance of modern society. It seemed that
modern European intelligence could have put the problem to an end with
natural science and philosophy, but it came back on a broad scale again
in the 19th
century: ideological conflicts in politics, and the conflicts and confusions
among academic schools and theories within modern experimental studies, which
Husserl called the crisis in European sciences.
Why can we not find the way of solving the
problem of belief conflict instead of overcoming it in the realm of human
sciences, while there is a development of what is considered as objective
knowledge in the realm of natural sciences? This confusion is increasingly
serious problem. Against a background of this crisis in human sciences, the
tendency of relativism and skepticism is getting stronger in sciences and
thoughts. The conflict between Marxism which calls for the exclusively right
world view and postmodern thoughts which appeared as the opposing thought
against it epitomizes this tendency. It bears the aspect of the replay of the
conflict between Spinozan dogmatism and Humean relativism.
Husserl considered Phenomenological
essential epistemology as the fundamental methodology of overcoming this
theoretical and belief conflict which modern science and thought cannot
resolve, and this manifesto is explicitly shown in his book Crisis.
(4) Phenomenology as ‘science of essence’ (excerpt)
Husserl says in The Idea of Phenomenology that the possibility of ‘metaphysics’ in
a true meaning is dependent on the essential ‘question of epistemology’ in
phenomenology. What Husserl meant by ‘metaphysics’ is not in a negative sense
but in the most universal ontological meaning.
In Crisis, Husserl insists that although the task of ‘metaphysics’ in this sense
used to be the most essential idea in modern philosophy, modern human science
based on positive science has spoiled this idea by ‘turning away from
the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity.’ Namely, ‘merely
fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.’
The concept of ‘the science of essence’ had
to reach the universal and a priori science of human relationship in the
life-world. That is to say, it meant the universal science about the occurring
meanings and the values in human life (the quest for ‘fundamental occurring of
meanings’ in the life-world). This concept is well told in Crisis. According to Husserl, although philosophy has originally
started as what included the idea of self-understanding of the existence and
life of human beings derived from the Renaissance, this idea has ended up in
failure in the mid-19th century.
The fundamental reason of that, Husserl
says, lies in the fact that ‘the enigma of the problem of cognition’ (this is
called ‘the enigma of subjectivity’ in Crisis)
has not been elucidated. This made positivism, whose task bases on ‘the
agreement of subject and object’ or objectively true knowledge, dominate the
idea of European sciences, and made the questions of the meanings and the
values of human existence ignored which philosophy should have quested for.
Phenomenology can be by far the foundation
stone, which elucidates the ‘enigma’ by implementing the essential ‘criticism
of cognition’ and once again opens the way to make philosophy become the
universal ‘science of essence’ beyond ‘the science of fact.’ This is the chief
motive of Husserl’s phenomenology shown in Crisis
However, it is hard to say that Husserl’s
concept of the science of essence could have been developed in a full-scale
manner. This is the reason that ambiguity is found in what Husserl meant by
‘the science of essence.’ But we can say that what he called ‘the science of
spirit’ (namely human science) does not mean the quest for the fact but for the
essence. We can see the concrete image of this in the section of ‘original
formation of meaning in life-world’ in Crisis,
or ‘the constitution of the spiritual world’ in Ideas II.
Anyhow, Husserl’s phenomenology had a wide range which starts from the
fundamental ‘critics of cognition’ and ‘the essential theory of cognition’
to ‘the universal theory of the meanings’ of human world.
The attempt of ‘the grounding of the
validity of cognition,’ which Husserl did as the first step, or especially the
emphasis on the concept of ‘the absolute giveness’ and ‘the absolute evidence,’
which was submitted against skepticism, made phenomenology misunderstood and
criticized by many contemporary thinkers (Ricoeur, Rorty, etc.) as
‘the grounding of the absolute truth’ or ‘the grounding of the strict cognition
of objectivity.’ Husserl’s phenomenology is understood as the logicism which
tries to go back to the old metaphysical truism searching for the ground of the
‘apodictical truth’ by these thinkers.
However, we must say that these criticisms
against phenomenology are by far the misconceptions. We can turn down these
criticisms by clearly articulating the basic structure of the problem of
cognition which phenomenology had tackled, and the ‘principle’ which had
elucidated this enigma. The reason for that is because the principle which
elucidated the enigma is never compatible with the concept such as ‘the
grounding of the truth’ or ‘the grounding of the validity of objective
knowledge.’
(5) The fate of skepticism (excerpt)
What Husserl aimed at by elucidation of ‘the
enigma of the problem of cognition’ was firstly to overcome the problem of
‘belief conflict’ in cognition, and secondly to reconstruct philosophy again as
a universal science of essence.
But before examining these two problems, we
should confirm several points about skepticism as an immediate task.
In ‘The Idea of Phenomenology’ Husserl
argues as below.
In philosophy, it is skepticism that has
represented the standpoint of the impossibility (enigma) of cognition. The
sciences of natural thinking, having ‘the schema of subject-object’ as a basic
presupposition, do not bring it into question.
However, in the field of human
science (Geisteswissenschaften), no doubt, the definite tendency of the general
relativity of sciences emerges in practice, the problem is at issue. But, as long as the modern positivistic
human science is based on the foothold of ‘the agreement of object-subject’, it
has no way to solve the problem from the very outset. For that reason, Husserl
put an emphasis on the way of Descartes refuting skepticism by ‘methodical
doubt’, namely, the way of setting up ‘the platform of the absolutely indubitable’
But here’s a misleading context.
In order to elucidate ‘the enigma of the theory of cognition’, we have
to find out the ground of the validity of cognition which can fully refute
skepticism, therefore, fix the realm of completely indubitable cognition
which is suggested by Descartes, that is , the realm of ‘primal cognition’,
claimed Husserl.
However, although we understand that finding
out the primal cognition means the decisive refutation against skepticism,
Husserl’s argument cannot be said to be fully convincing as for why that means
the very elucidation of the enigma of the problem of cognition. For, Descartes found out the primal
cognition, ‘cogito’ by methodical doubt, but from here, he secured the
possibility of ‘agreement of subject-object’ by proving the existence of God.
If Husserl takes the same way as Descartes,
it is no wonder that people think of phenomenology as an attempt at the
restoration of strict truism.However,
although Husserl and Descartes stand the same position with respect to securing
the primal cognition as opposition to skepticism, Husserl is quite different from
Descartes in how to ground ‘the possibility of universal cognition’ from ‘the
primal cognition’. But on this point
Husserl didn’t explain clearly.
The point in which the principle of Husserlian
phenomenology is decisively distinguished from Descartes is that in Husserl the
schema of ‘subject-object’ is completely abandoned, instead, that of
‘immanence-transcendence’ is set up. And what this schema of
‘immanence-transcendence’ means is the most crucial problem in phenomenology.
In this respect, the method of Husserl is quite different from Kantian
‘transcendental idealism’ as well.
What is the essential meaning of Husserlian
phenomenology replacing the traditional schema of epistemology:
‘subject-object’ with that of ‘immanence ?transcendence’? I wound say here, a viewpoint of regarding every ‘knowledge’ not as the correct grasping of ‘objective existence’ but as ‘belief’ in objective existence in general.
In other words, the schema of
‘immanence-transcendence’ means not a viewpoint of how ‘subject’ meets ‘object’
correctly but a method of seizing how
‘transcendence’ is formed in
‘immanence’. That is, the method of elucidating the structure of the credibility
of ‘belief-forming’.
Husserl holds in ‘the Idea’ that any thoroughgoing
skeptic has, in fact, the tacit belief of his own existence and the existence
of the world itself.
That is the tacit existence-credibility
about the world itself which everyone has with no exception. ( Husserl calls it
‘the general positing of the world’ in ‘Ideas’, and ‘Urdoxa’ in other
case.
As long as a skeptic has the freedom to
deny his tacit credibility of the world, it is meaningless to compel him to
recognize it. So, Husserl views it that: although no one can prove the
objective existence of the world in logic, any one has the ‘Urdoxa’ of the
world without exception, so this problem is settles [solved] when we elucidate
the structure and the essence of the reason for that situation. (Husserl’s dissertation of ‘Ideas’ from
section 30 on is the description of the structure of ‘the
world-credibility’.
Husserl’s words in the post script of ‘Ideas’
best shows that phenomenology is the theory of inner ‘belief-formation’,
namely, the general theory of the credibility-structure’ of the world.
《Its
(phenomenological idealism’s) sole task and accomplishment is to clarify the
sense of this world, precisely the sense in which everyone accepts it-and
rightly so-as actually existing. That the world exists, that it is given as
existing universe in uninterrupted experience which is constantly fusing into
universal concordance, is entirely beyond doubt.》
(6) Immanence-Transcendence
Schema and the Structure of Formation of
Belief (excerpt)
Thus, we have two tasks for the time being;
Firstly, to
definitely establish the principleof
the method of phenomenological reduction.
Secondly, to make
clear how science of essence may
unfold based on the method phenomenological reduction.
First of all, what is the principle of
phenomenological reduction? I would
define it in terms of two main points:
（1)To abandon the Subject-Object schema. That is, we must be free from the schema,
according to which a certain object being exists somewhere “outside” and a Subject is able to correctly cognize it. This is what epoche signifies.
(2)To replace the Subject-Object schema with an Immanence-Transcendence schema. As discussed above, it is essential to
understand the fundamental structure where what matters is not how correctly
the subject can comprehend the external object (truth), but how cognition
(transcendence) is constituted as belief in the <immanent consciousness>.
In
this case, however, the
Immanence-transcendence Schema should not be considered as a so-called cognitive constitution theoryin the context of Kantian philosophy. This is here the most important aspect to be
confirmed.
Eugen Fink once suggested that the Husserl’s
notion of transcendental constitution
constantly fluctuates ‘between formation of meaning and creation’ As is well known, Landgrebe took this opinion
and raised this as one of the most difficult questions of phenomenology. (See
‘Reflection on the Husserl’s constitution theory’ in “The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology”).
The questions raised by Fink and Landgrebe
focus on which should be stressed, spontaneity or passivity, in terms of the
notion of “constitution” of meaning
(noesis) in phenomenology. Does a
subject itself give some meaning, or
does it come from somewhere beyond the subject? That is the question.
This is however merely a question to be
settled by inner reflection, and by
no means the matter essentially important for the method of phenomenology. In regard to this question, it is vital to
comprehend the difference between the Kantian cognitive constitution theory
and the constitution theory of
Husserl, both of which tried to grasp the essence
of cognition in their own radical ways of thinking.
According to Kant, while no one can know a priorihow the world is, everyone is
able to know a priorihow human cognition
is “structured”. This a priori
comprehension alone tells us the boundary line of our world knowledge by means
of reason in an essential manner.
Kant insists that human cognition is
structured to have a priori forms of sensation, understanding and reason. Sensation itself has a priori forms of time
and space, understanding an a priori form of category and reason finally
constitutes the formality of ultimate ideas of immortal soul, freedom and a
supreme being. We are allowed to know
that human reason, i.e., human idea has such a constitution. This is the Kantian
theory of cognitive constitution.
This leads to a conclusion that humans are
unable to know how the world exists in its ultimate and complete way and that
therefore, while the world is
reconceptualized as a thing-in-itself
, the objectivity of human cognition can be guaranteed only in the context of
commonalities of human experiences.
How about Husserl’s epistemology then? It is totally distinguished from the Kantian
theory of ‘cognitive structure’ in which human knowledge is regarded as
actually structured as such and such.
Briefly looking at the development of
European epistemology, Kant first conceived
the basic structure of ideas, i.e., sensitivity, understanding and reason and
their respective formalities. This
conception was however immediately dismissed by a succeeding great philosopher,
Georg Hegel. The essential framework of Hegelian epistemology consists of
being, essence and conception, with categoriesconsidered to evolve around this structure. It is to be noted that, taking a notion of category (framework of thinking) for example, how to understand it
is extremely varied from philosopher to philosopher.
The notion of constitutionused by Husserl refers to the way we
<constitute> transcendence from
immanence. However, what this constitution of transcendence from immanence means is not very
clear, because in the first place the conception of transcendence allows for a number of ambiguous
interpretations.
The word transcendence
is frequently used in Husserl’s texts, and can be interpreted in many
ways. When it is said that act of
consciousness in immanence is to
“constitute” transcendence, what does
it mean? This constitution is generally
understood as a constitution of the meaning
of an objective being (noema). In
other words, we may say that constitution
is the way we cognize what an object
is.
The problem is however what this cognition means. As has been seen above, cognitive constitution theory,
Husserl’s conceptions of constitution
and transcendence are always
ambiguous: it is by and large impossible
for Husserl’s readers to grasp what these conceptions exactly mean by studying
the commentaries and interpretations of various Husserlian scholars. Transcendence is at one time understood as
something which is not immanent or real, at another time as that which
transcends subject or its experience, and yet at another time as something
similar to ‘Ekstase’ (ecstases) in Heidegger. The reason why the conception of constitution
cannot be established is because the concept of transcendence itself has never been satisfactorily defined.
Now I would like to express my own view: Husserl’s notion of transcendence should be understood as
the belief of the existence of an object <constituted> within a
subject. In other words, without
taking this very view, it must be very difficult for anyone to understand in
what principle Husserl unraveled the puzzle
of the question of cognition.
Since I already wrote several
books on this subject, here I would mention merely some of collateral evidence
without plunging myself into a detailed demonstrative discussion. However, I would like to go into detail on
another important aspect, that is, what kind of comprehension is made possible by my own interpretation of the
essence of Husserl’s phenomenology.
《In contradistinction, as we know, it is of the
essence of the physical world that no perception, however perfect, presents
anything absolute in that realm; and essentially connected with this is the
fact that any experience, however extensive, leaves open the possibility that
what is given does notexist in
spite of the continual consciousness of its own presence "in person."
According to eidetic law it is the case that physical existence is never required as necessaryby the givenness
of something physical, but is always in a certain manner contingent. This
means: It can always be that the further course of experience necessitates
giving up what has already been posited with a legitimacy derived from experience.Afterwards one says it was a
mere illusion, a hallucination, merely a coherent dream, or the like.》 ( ‘Ideas’ §46 translated by F. KERSTEN)
Section 46 of “Ideas” as quoted above is one
of the most important parts of the text discussing the relationship between immanence and transcendence. Here Husserl
first emphasizes that, in the domain of immanent
perception, “the real existence ”confirmed there “cannot be denied in
principle”. He then insists that in
contrast, in the domain of transcendent
perception, i.e. the world of things,
a cognition of whatever seemingly complete and unsuspicious object never gives something absolute in essence..
If we attempt to replace his
notion of transcendence with
some words understandable to everyone, the words can be nothing other than a belief of the existence of an object. On this assumption, I believe I can
paraphrase the account of Husserl as follows.
All of what we consider as the objective world of things is eventually our belief, that is, our belief of existencewhich is constituted
(formed) within our subject(immanence). However vastly our experiences extend,
whatever consistent, realistic and unchangeable sense of reality fills our flow
of experience, one cannot eliminate in principle the possibility that the thing
is not real. However rich and vivid an experience is, one
can never deny that it could have been a dream. On the contrary, whether it is dream or not, it is absolutely impossible
to deny that we have lived the experience
as our immanence (mental process). We therefore maintain that, while immanencegives something absolute, transcendence (belief of real existence)
can always be doubted in nature.
Reality
in the real world
(=transcendence), that is, our belief
of real existence is intrinsically guaranteed only by the fact that a continuous /harmonious unity is steadily
maintained in the flux of our experiences. There is however no promise that this continuous harmony could
permanently stay, so that variability constantly abides with this belief of
real existence. That a reality which has never been doubted so
far suddenly changes and become deprived of its validity may happen anytime as it is an intrinsic nature to the
domain of transcendence..
If we understand Husserl’s notion of transcendence as a belief-formation of the world, the existence of an object and the
way an object exists, his notions of validity
and constitution will also become
crystal-clear. Let us give another example.
《……point to a universal conformity to
laws of structure on the conscious life, a regularity by virtue
of which alone truth and actuality have, and / are able to have, sense for us.
To be sure, that objects in the broadest sense (real physical things,
subjective processes, numbers, states of affairs, laws, theories, and the rest)
exist for me is a statement that says nothing immediately about evidence; it
says only that objects are accepted by me - are, in other words, there for me
as cogitata intended in the positional mode: certain believing.》(CM§26)
It seems to me that the text
given above can be interpreted in no other way than as follows: We express the
actuality and truthiness regarding existence and the modes of existence of
various objects (things, matters, rules, etc.) by using the words truth and reality. However, when we say something certainly has its reality or truthfulness,
it by no means confirms the reality or truth of an object itself, but merely
means that the reality etc. has been established within <my> or
<our> subject as a firm and invariable consciousness of belief in the
existing object. No doubt, what Husserl
means here by saying that an object is valid
for me is that a belief=convictionconcerning
the object has been formed (constituted) within our subject.
(7) Theory of
Belief -Structure of World-Conviction
We have to make sure at first that, though
it is not wrong to name Husserl’s phenomenology a theory of cognitive constitution, it is something different from
a ‘imaginarily created’theory of cognitive structure like that of
Kant. It should be considered instead as
an utterly unique theory where any knowledge or cognition is grasped as a
structure of belief constitution.
When we think this way, a decisive
difference between the Kant’s and Husserl’s constitution theories is revealed
to us. The framework of cognition with
three forms of sensation, understanding and reason taught by Kant is merely his
own conceptualization. Whether it is adopted by other people or not depends on
the person.
On the contrary, the most remarkable feature
in Husserl’s cognitive constitution theory is that it is a method, by which one
directly ‘sees’ through one’s inner reflection how immanence constitutes
transcendence (i.e., various beliefs of existence). This method must be such that, in principle,
the description of this structure of
belief formation within consciousness can be done in the same way by
everyone. In other words, the essential
core of the method of reduction is to extract only a “structure” that is regarded
as the same for everyone. Let us set
this aside for now, though.
When, in any case, we understand the notion
of transcendence as a belief of the existenceof an object
constituted in immanence, the whole picture of Husserl’s method of phenomenological
reduction and its great potential will be disclosed to us very clearly. Let me elaborate this below.
I already mentioned the existing “solutions”
for the enigma of subject-object agreement problem in European philosophies. Let me briefly summarize them as follows:
1. Theory of
rational deductibility for the entire world as taught by Spinoza
2. Sheer relativism
as suggested by Hume, Nietzsche’s view-related cognition theory, post-modern
thoughts, and skeptical-logical relativism in contemporary analytic philosophy.
3. Relative
objective knowledge theory like that of Auguste Comte. He pointed out that, while there is no such
thing as metaphysical absolute cognition, some objective knowledge certainly
exists if we view knowledge as a practical requirement. Modern positive sciences have apparently
developed based on this approach.
An important point is however that all these
frameworks of epistemology, except for that of Nietzsche, implicitly assume thesubject-objectschema as their
premise. Relativism = skepticism is
constantly taking the lead on the enigma
of cognitive problem and insists on relativizing a certain [all] knowledge
or that there exists no universal cognition. Relativism claims logically in its own way that if truth exists, agreement between subject and object
must be proved, but such a proof is simply impossible. This means that this negation theory also
stands on the ground of the subject-object
agreementschema itself.
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction on the
other hand offers an entirely new solution for this enigma of subject-object agreement. This is indeed a type of approach that has come into existence for the
first time in the history of European philosophy and cannot be found in
philosophical teachings in any other civilization. It is a principleof regarding everything as belief-formation in immanence.
How could this approach redefine the problem of cognition?
I will give an overview as follows.
As has been discussed in the text of my
“Complete Decoding of Husserl’s Ideas of Phenomenology”, Husserl’s point lies
in replacing the subject-object
schema with immanence-transcendence
schema. This specifically means: Not
that we face an external object and
precisely duplicate it by means of our subject
(=cognition); we depart from mental process(immanence) in our subject, where we in each case [every
time] constitute our belief ofthe existence and meaning of various
objects including things, affairs, humans and social relations, ideas and the
world.
Consequently, any of our perception, judgment and cognition is
a belief of the existence and meaning
of an object, or to be more exact, an established belief that the object certainly exists, of the way it exists and
of the certainty regarding the significance of its existence. The key task of phenomenological method is
above all to analyze the belief structure
in terms of such diverse beliefs of existence.
This analysis will make very clear what
Husserl intended to mean by arguing that
transcendence is a doxa in every
regard, a validity that can never be
verified in its existence and can never give an absolute something.
Transcendence is not an identification of a
fact. Judgment or cognition, whatever it
is, is a transcendence and cannot be
an ultimate terminus. Since any judgment
or cognition is a transcendence or belief of an objective existence that is
incessantly <constituted> out of a constantly varying stream of experience (immanence),
the fact of belief is always subject to change in accordance with variation of
a continuous unity within the immanence. The key thesis of the statement that transcendence does not give an absolute something
and is always associated with some dubitability is that transcendence
invariably stands for a belief of
different objects being actually <constituted> by the immanence.
Most notably, Husserl believed that this
solution alone is able to completely solve the enigma of cognitive problem together with skepticism which has brought this enigma before us.
Let us make sure of what was meant by the enigma of cognitive problem. Why is it referred to as an enigma?
The reason is not merely that the logical
impossibility of subject-object agreement
means an utter impossibility of human knowledge of the world. The enigma is rather in the question why,
despite the fact that subject-object
agreement is logically unsustainable, an obviously objective knowledge
exists in the disciplines of mathematics and natural sciences and we often have
an unquestionable mutual agreement in
our views on various daily matters.
With some account complementary to Husserl’s
own, his theory of belief structure
is believed to present an overall picture of world cognition as follows.
We are all constantly <constituting>
our world knowledge of different levels as beliefbased on our own mental process experience.,and are leading our social life by exchanging such diverse world beliefs with one another. An overview of such beliefs can be given as follows.
1. Subjective
belief
2. Communal
belief
3. Universal
belief
(2 and 3
are referred to as intersubjectivityby
Husserl himself.)
1.Beliefs formed by individual subjects
are maintained by perception and memory of immanence
(individual intuition) and by the integration and agreement of meanings (essential insight ) associated
with such individual intuition. This is
so to speak a synchronic structure of belief. Such integration of meanings becomes a belief of an object in terms of reality
only when supplied with temporal continuation, i.e. a continuous harmony. This is
a diachronic structure of belief.
What is essential here is that anyone is
able to cognize and extract one’s immanent belief
structure about the belief of an object by reflecting one’s immanent consciousness.
Husserl’s analysis in the “Ideas” mainly
focuses on this belief structure of
inner belief. （This structure is here explained using
Husserl’s own terms such as horizon, the actional-the nonactional, adumbration, cogitatio-cogitatum, immanence-transcendence,etc. Note that Sections 33 to 46 are especially important.）
2.Another key
argument is that, as inner reflection goes ahead, the subject’s belief structure regarding belief of things is strongly
supported by a belief that we are sharing our belief of things with
others.
It is to be noted that the
subject’s belief that the real world
and objects exist in reality is sustained, not by sharing belief of an object with others, but by a subject’s implicit belief or credit in that
it shares the same belief with others. This is what we call an intersubjective
belief structure.
3.The world belief
shared with others establishes a communal
world belief. For instance, a credit
for ethnic religions or divine rights of kings is built up as a communal world belief. Human society is indeed nothing but a network
of such communal beliefs. Any community
or society is unable to exist without such a communal belief.
Here is however another important dimension. Modern society has developed a new image of the
world completely distinguished from preceding ones (the world of nature in
general) by the method of natural science. This is also an intersubjective belief, of course, but is marked by a
nature distinct from the credit for religions or divine rights of kings.
Such an intersubjective belief is
characterized in that once it is established, it would never be relinquished
entirely, and instead be expanded while being selectively diversified and
modified. I would like to call this a universal belief.
Though I should not go into details about
this notion of intersubjective belief structure for now, I understand that Husserl’s
method of phenomenological reduction presents an epistemology of world as such
a belief structure of world belief. Only when it is interpreted in this way,
phenomenology can be an entirely new and original principle of epistemology
which will figure out the existing enigma
of epistemology.
We shall benefit in the following three
respects from such an understanding of Husserl’s epistemology: It is not like Kantian cognition constitution
theory claiming that one constitutes an objective knowledge by means of a
particular framework of knowledge, but is to be taken as a belief constitution theoryregarding world knowledge.
(1)All the
arguments for relativism=skepticism are completely refuted;
(2)Benefit 1
however does not mean to reinstate objectivism (subject-object agreement
schema), but to dismiss it outright; and
(3)Universality of cognition can yet be secured in some way other than subject-object agreement.
The long-lasting enigma of cognitive problem is now to be completely resolved by
these three benefits.
(The meaning of established belief can easily
be understood by thinking about the past. One’s past experience can be identified only
as a structure of intersubjective belief. Its real existence can never be proved, because any realistic evidence
whatsoever is merely one for present experience. )
(8) Fallacy of Criticism of Phenomenology
I shall refer to two most typical theories
criticizing phenomenology.
We have thus a prescription for the most general form of our question;
do not phenomenological necessity, the rigor and subtlety of Husserl’s
analysis, the exigencies to which it responds and which we must first recognize,
nonetheless conceal a metaphysical presupposition? Do they not harbor
a dogmatic or speculative commitment ……. This would be done precisely
in what soon comes to be recognized as the source and guarantee of all
value, the principle of principles: i.e., the original self-giving evidence,
the present or presence of sense to a full and primordial intuition. (“Speech
and Phenomena”, Introduction, Translated by David B. Allison and Newton
Garver)
I defined, in one of my books “An
Introduction to Phenomenology”, Derrida’s criticism of Husserl as a criticism
against the idea of Origin based on
his argument of differance . Derrida’s discussion offers a typical example
of criticism of objective knowledge from a standpoint of logical relativism.
Objective knowledge has long been built on a
foundation that a sure cognition acknowledged by anyone is posed as a
so-to-speak axiom, based on which valid inferences may be carried out step by
step. The theory of
relativism=skepticism antagonistic to objective recognition has also a
particular style on its own.
It examines the most basic certain cognition acknowledged by
anyone and argues that any cognition,
however certain it appears, is unable to have absolute certainty when examined
methodically.
Derrida applies this very logic
to the principle of principles maintained
by Husserl. It offers several variations
but their basic structure is the same.
Thus we come to let signs themselves depend on repeatability and presence,
the simplest signdepend on possibility of re-presence. We let the presence
of present be derived from repetition, and not vice versa.(“Speech and Phenomena”Translated from J.E by Isobe)
As is well known, Husserl mentioned
individual intuition and seeing an essence (seeing a meaning) as a source of the legitimacy of all knowledge. The observations, according to Husserl,
should be accepted as they manifest themselves and this approach was named by
him the principle of principles. This is so to speak the primary cognition defined by Husserl.
According to him, perceptive representation (
individual intuition) is the primal
cognitionon which all other cognitions are based. Any knowledge begins with perceptionactually taking place. Derrida by
contrast claims as follows: Representation (perceptive image) cannot be defined
as the primary thing, that is, the most original
place where knowledge begins. It is
because, while perceptive image appears to have a privileged presence as an absolute now, an extended investigation makes us find that this
image of absolute nowhas already
been “constituted”.
As anyone can see, a vivid presence (now) that is to be a source of
all knowledge is actually unable to exist as such, but is given by constantly
being provided with re-presence (a past). In other words, the now= presence
(source) is made possible only by the effect of re-presence (incessant feeding of past = act of differance).
This argument is one of those typical
critical discourses given by logical relativists and post-modern and logical
analysis philosophers, but is utterly invalid as a criticism against Husserl’s
phenomenology. Let me give the reasons
summarized as follows.
Derrida’s argument against absolute
foundation of knowledge may be called pre-constitutional
criticism. According to it, in-depth
analysis teaches us that any basic element, however fundamental it may be, is
in no way an absolute source, but has something more specific or subordinate
that “constitutes” the basic element. Consequently, we cannot establish anything as an ultimately original
element. (In Kant’s discussion on
Antinomies, the same logic is used to argue that one cannot define the minimum
unit of a thing.)
Derrida’s argument reverts back to a classical approach of skepticism. It
is to be noted that Hegel gives a more substantial discussion on this subject. Hegel
reduces all the phenomena to a phenomenon of “consciousness experience”
in his “Phenomenology of Spirit”. All things are then to be verified
as affairs of consciousness. However, according to Hegel, since
any consciousness phenomenon is based on a temporal constitution, one can
by no means find an absolutely original element or moment in consciousness
(this is why truth can arise only in terms of dialectic process).
The advantage of Hegel’s criticism of
pre-constitution theory over Derrida’s sophistical counter-criticism is that it
essentially relies on the structure of time and consciousness This impossibility of any original element
manifested by Hegel is exactly what incites different ways of criticizing
pre-constitution theory as in relativism and skepticism.
Derrida’s criticism of original source still
tends to be substantialistic. However,
even Hegel’s approach that consciousness has a temporal structure in nature so
that all things come to exist as already
constituted cannot be a valid criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology. Why?
(＊ It is because our present vivid perceptive observation which is itself Husserl’s
primal knowledge is not a ground for subject-object agreement, but a ground for
formation of belief. A specific
explanation is given below.)
Criticism of pre-constitution theory in
epistemology suggested by Hegel is however valid only for an objective knowledge
theory (universal cognition theory) which presumes the subject-object agreement schema. Relativism=skepticism has also criticized this objectivism as posing an enigma of cognitive problem.(？) Derrida’s
notion of differance signifies that one cannot find any absolute source or firm
ground in knowledge. (Among the ways of
criticizing the objective knowledge theory based on relativism, the most well
known is the one formulated bySextus Empiricus, the philosopher in ancient Rome,
who offered 17 different reasons for criticism. Hegel in turn gave an in-depth criticism of this kind of skeptical reasoning
by quoting Empiricus in his “Lectures on the History of Philosophy”.
)
Derrida assumes that he is able to refute
Husserl’s metaphysical ambition by
criticizing his absolute presence. It is because Derrida deems it to be
Husserl’s idea that an absolute presence
of an individual observation in a subject exactly forms evidence for a presence of an object before the subject.
As has been discussed above in detail,
however, the basic method of phenomenology is not in forming a foundation for subject-object agreement, but for the belief structure of world belief.
The argument for indefinability of original
element given by pre-constitution criticism may be able to demonstrate the
impossibility of subject-object agreementbut can never prove that the idea of belief
structure is unfoundable.
2. The notion of
giving a foundation for belief structureindicates
the following. We usually understand by
knowledge or cognition as an act by which a subject
copies an objective reality of itself
in some way. This is what is called the
subject-object agreementscheme. According to Husserl, however, the notion of
an absolutely existing entirety of the world is already a nonsense. (See
Section 55 in “Ideas”) Then what should
we understand by cognition?
All cognition is a belief in existence of the world and objects. Husserl declares:
《The existence of a Nature cannotbe the condition for the existence of
consciousness, since Nature itself turns out to be a correlate of consciousness:
Nature isonly as being constituted in regular concatenations of consciousness.》(§51)
What is meant by saying that the nature
world is a correlative of consciousness
is that it exists for us only as a ”belief” constituted within our <immanent
consciousness>. In other words, that
an object, a thing or a matter exists
for us signifies that it is formed as a belief
of consciousness or a correlative of validity. This understanding will make the meaning of
this text clear to everybody.
An event of a dream exists only for a
certain individual subject. An apple I have here, by contrast, gives us
an intersubjective belief that it must exist not only for me but for other
people around me. (Note that a nutrient
contained in the apple, for instance citric acid, gives us a validity=belief of
its existence only as a result of our scientific pursuit.)
God has long been regarded valid (believed) by
many people across the world as an unquestionable, indisputable real existence, especially by the people of medieval Europe. It has, on the other hand, never established validity beyond communal beliefin any period of time.
As is readily understood, out of various
things and matters we know, some do not go beyond a subjective belief, and others a communal
belief. Other objects, on the other
hand, give us common validity of their existence, that is, universal belief,
whichever nation, culture and religion we may belong to.
We assume that a real thing is known by
anybody as “one and the same objective existence”. This is however reverse to the fact in
epistemological context. The fact is
that when we come to believe that an object is unquestionably one and the same thing for anyone, we
call the object a real thing.
Thus, the enigma of epistemology imposed for long on philosophy by skepticism
can be fully elucidated only by the way we understand knowledge in general as a
belief structure.
We can never discover a ground for subject-object agreement to be approved
by everyone. If there is no such a thing
as subject-object agreement, it will
make no sense to question about the possibility of knowledge, say, to ask if
universal knowledge may exist at all.
Despite the fact that logically there is no
subject-object agreement, why have people developed an awfully extensive system
of objective knowledge and are still
keeping expanding it? Why is it that
while the approach of natural science has established a universal system of objective knowledge, human science is by
no means able to do so? What should we
understand by the notion of universality
of knowledge in human science?
These questions at least can be perfectly
answered in principle by means of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction we have
examined above.
(9) Logic of Appearance (excerpt)
Kant once discussed onratio cognoscendi forfreedom in his first and second
Critiques. The question of whether or not freedom exists is to be
termed by his own words ,a logic of appearance.
The reason why the question has been so significant in Europe is in its
Christian view of God’s Creation of the world and the subsequent view
of objectivistic natural science. The implicit assumption that there
exists the truth about the world and objects as such makes human freedom
enigmatic.
The notion of freedom is in nature rooted in creation and order of meanings
in the context of human relations. It is logically wrong to consider it
to be a substantial causa. Questioning whether or not freedom truly
exists is merely a logic of appearance arising from substantiation of conceptions,
just like questioning whether or not everything is fatally determined.
Philosophically, we should ask, under what kind of conditions one might
feel deprived of one’s (sense of) freedom.
Likewise, the enigma of cognition(whether or not true knowledge is possible)
raised by relativism=skepticism and their argument that such true knowledge
is impossible now proves to be logic of appearance. This question
first of all presumes the subject-object agreementschema and then tries
to determine that such an agreement is impossible. Once this subject-object
agreement schema is abandoned however, this question itself can also be
dismissed as that of appearance.
I should now point out that many theories criticizing phenomenology regard
it as aspiring to revive the classical subject-object agreement schema
after all. Such a view is however derived from a failure to see the
basic structure of phenomenological epistemology. Such criticisms
are found not only in contemporary proponents of relativism but also in
German school of phenomenology, to which Husserl’s direct students including
Eugen Fink and Klaus Held belong.
Held, in his well-known
book “The Living Present” , poses the following points as problems necessarily
arising from Husserl’s method of phenomenology.
Firstly, ego captured by reflection is already an ego turned to be an object Secondly,
ego remains at stop, and at the same time keeps streaming.
Thirdly, ego temporalizes itself, but also exists in itself as present. (translated
from Japanese Edition)
Held pursued this question and claimed that here is a deep-rooted enigma
for the method of phenomenology, naming it an enigma of the living present.
The key issue is that phenomenological pure ego is an ego toobjectivize
and an ego to be objectivized (reflected) at the same time, and that it
is a streaming ego and an ego at a stop as oneat the same time.
《Simply because the reflective being‐nization is the phenomenologically
possible only way of experience of a primordially functioning ego, simply
for this reason, a question remains enigmatic: how should a temporal functioning
presence be questioned beyond such an experience?》 （ “The Living Present”.Translated
from J.E by Isobe）
The enigma emerges, according to Held, in that the ego to objectivize itselfcan
never be objectivized (captured by reflection). Many other phenomenologists
including Fink and Landgrebe share with him this view that here is an unsolvable
enigma as they suppose Husserl’s phenomenology is an exploring effort
for the ultimate origin of ego or consciousness.
This view shares however the same logic with such relativistic paradoxes
as “Eyes see everything but cannot see themselves”, and “You can never
step into the same stream.” Derrida’s critical argument against
Husserl, “’Now’ exists only in its incessant passing into the past”
belongs that logic as well. This way of reasoning is always replayed by
contemporary thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Derrida and Foucault by such
terms as self-reference and、cycle of object level and meta level.
All these paradoxes, however, merely rely on logic of appearance presuming
the subject-object agreement schema and substantiated conceptions.
Let us see for example a famous logical paradox that Achilles could not
overtake the tortoise. If someone believes this paradox is a “proof”
that a person is actually unable to overtake the tortoise, we could not
but think this person is an airhead！Any philosophical thought of essential
nature finds a fatal weakness in this paradox as Achilles overtakes the
tortoise in reality, and suggests that what iselucidated by philosophy
is such a logical weakness itself. Husserl proposed exactly this type
of philosophy.
Consciousness-centrism, subjectivism, logicism, solipticism etc --- Husserl’s
phenomenology is generally labeled as such by his critics. Any of them
however fails to comprehend the crucial point of modern epistemology and
simply dismisses the possibility of universal knowledgeby taking advantage
of relativistic paradoxes. There is no legitimacy of criticism in
this kind of approach.
Criticism of Husserl by Held or Fink is not distinguished from those contemporary
relativistic teachings in logic, but is rather motivated by their intent
to incorporate phenomenology into the pursuit of European metaphysics of
being mainly advocated by Heidegger. This approach is however nothing
but a breakaway from the intrinsic significance of Husserl’s phenomenology.
(10) Conclusion --- Philosophy as Science of Essence.
As we have made sure of the fallacy of modern criticism of phenomenology,
we shall, once again, have an overview of the science of essential critique
of cognitionthat Husserl attempted to offer in the “Idea of Phenomenology”. Let
us confirm the following three points:
(1) What is the key theme of Husserl’s phenomenology? What kind of
problem does it intend to elucidate?
(2)
By what method does it try to analyze it?
(3)
What will be created as a result of this analysis?
(1)What
is the key theme of Husserl’s phenomenology?
To unravel the enigma of epistemology which modern philosophy failed to
solve --- this is the prime theme. Why is it of essential significance
for philosophy? Since the disciplines of modern mental science(human
science) misconceived the nature of cognition, they adopted as the basis
of their pursuit the method of natural science which is founded on the
subject-object agreement schema. This has endangered the ideal of universality
of science.
This circumstance can be represented by two key terms, the enigma of cognitionand
settling the belief conflict.
(2)
By what method does it try to analyze it?
The enigma of cognition problem can be solved only by the method of phenomenological
reduction. The subject-object agreementschema must be subject to epoche
and replaced with immanence-transcendenceschema. That is, knowledge
or cognition altogether is to be conceived as a belief formed within an
individual subject in terms of the world and objects.
The notion that an object itself exists as a substance is here a nonsense. So
let us avoid a question of how or on what conditions knowledge corresponds
to an object , or such an interpretation that phenomenology is a way to
determine the conditions for correct or exact knowledge, or to identify
the essence or origin of metaphysical consciousness or ego. Such an
interpretation should inevitably lead phenomenology back to the antiquated
doctrine of the truth and metaphysics.
What is to be questioned in the first place is instead how immanence <constitutes>
transcendence; that is, how belief in general is established in our belief-structure. This
is to be followed by a question of how different beliefs could grow into
inter-subjective (communal) and universal beliefs. Especially, it
is a question on what conditions diverse beliefs could acquire indubitability
and become a broadly justifiable universal belief.
To determine the essential conditions and structure for formation of belief
in immanence, this is the key task prevalent over the entire domain of
phenomenological method.
The
essential conditions for establishment of belief structure for an object or
thing indicated by Husserl in his “The Idea of Phenomenology” and “Ideas” can
be divided in two major categories.
The first conditions are (1) that givenness of an object emerges in the
form of individual intuition (perception, memory, imagination.), (2) that
a certain essential insight (meaning=something universal) accompanies
with the individual intuition so that the two kind of giveness give the
object its identity in their harmonious unity.
The second condition is that this givenness is emerging in one’s temporal
flux of experiences with a constant continuous harmony.
(3)
What will be created as a result of this analysis?
The resolution of the enigma of cognition problem will bring to an end
all the arguments raised by skepticism against universality of knowledge.
It is not that knowledge altogether is relative or that no valid knowledge
exists. All the pieces of knowledge or cognition can be divided, depending
on the conditions of givennessin immanence, into a merely subjective belief,
a communal belief shared by a particular community, and lastly a universal
belief (universal knowledge) that can be shared by humans in general.
By means of this analysis of belief -structure of cognition in general,
phenomenology is able to leave the sphere of physical things as objects
of cognition and step into the vast domain of knowledge to be handled by
mental science or liberal arts. This is the very domain of the science
of essence that Husserl intended to establish.
Our world of things (surrounding world) always emerges based on our belief
structure concerning things or objects. According to Husserl’s view, the
human world (personalistic world) expands on the ground of such structure
of belief in existence of the surrounding world. (Although this subject
is mainly discussed in his “IdeasⅡ” and subsequent works, it is obvious
that analysis of the essential structure of personalistic world, instead
of physical world, is a vital core of Husserl’s science of essence.
By reference to his own terms, what is important about epistemological
analysis in this domain is to determine the conditions for creating meanings
in our living world. The aspects of believing in actual things’ existence
were not exactly a key interest for Husserl. The question was no doubt
on what conditions the subjective and inter-subjective belief could be
established in terms of diverse meanings developed by human relations
Husserl thus abandoned the subject-object agreement schema and replaced
it with immanence-transcendence schema by way of adhering to the basic
method of phenomenological reduction. He attempted to completely reorganize
philosophical epistemology this way. (We may compare this with the
counterpart achievements by Hume, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, but will not
go into detail here.) Husserl’s ultimate goal is a vision of the
science of essence to be established as phenomenology of reason.
Husserl wrote in Section 3 “Constitution of Mental World” in IdeasⅡ
)
《Already decades ago, reactions asserted themselves against the naturalistic
interpretation, self evident in the age of natural science, of the human
sciences as mere descriptive natural sciences. In the first rank Dilthey
has here earned for himself everlasting merit.……What is needed is a new
"psychology" of an essentially different type, a universal science
of the spirit that is neither "psychophysical" nor natural-scientific.》 (‘Ideas’Ⅱ §48)
“IdeasⅡ” begins with Part 3 Constitution of Mental World. He declares
in its introduction that he is now ready to unfold the universal science
on mind, i.e., mental scienceas the science of essence.
What was meant by the universal science on mind mentioned here largely
corresponds to his following discussion in his book “The Crisis .
Historically considered, the modern notion of science as a positivistic
one is only a marginal notion in terms of the ideal of science. Such
a positivistic science neglects all the disciplines of studies regarding
what has been referred to as metaphysicsin Europe (the science of existence
and the meaning of existence by the term of Husserl).
《Examined closely, these and all the excluded questions have their inseparable
unity in the fact that they contain(……)the problems of reason──reason
in all its particular forms. Reason is the explicit theme in the disciplines
concerning knowledge (i.e., of true and genuine, rational knowledge), of
true and genuine valuation (genuine values as values of reason), of ethical
action (truly good acting, acting from practical reason). (……) Positivism,
in a manner of speaking, decapitates philosophy.》('Crisis'§3)
The primary motive of Husserl’s phenomenology is firstly to establish
the essential theory of cognition by means of a radical critique of cognition
and the elucidation of the enigma of cognition. Secondly to reinstate,
as a science of essence concerning mental world, the modern human sciencethat
has been unable to achieve its purpose because it has based itself on the
method of positivism.
It should be marked that according to Husserl, the first and second tasks
are to be addressed by the same method of phenomenological reduction. This
method of phenomenological transcendental reduction evolves in the facets
of epoche, transcendental subject (pure ego), analysis of belief structure,
eidetic reduction(essential insight ). (A number of scholars insist
that Husserl’s phenomenological method has gone through considerable changes
in his lifetime. However, if we read Husserl’s text carefully with
no preoccupation, it seems indisputable that the substance of this method,
i.e., the way immanence is constituted by transcendence, had been coherent
and consistent all the way through his works from the “Idea” to “Experience
and Judgment”, though I refrain from demonstrating it in detail here.)
“The Crisis” exquisitely coveys his motif of science of essence as studies
on universality of reason or mind. The following words found in this
book seem quite symbolic in this context.
When we consider the effect of the development of the ideal of philosophy
on all mankind, we should say as follows: The fight of philosophy form
Descartes up to present means that of‘ humanity which struggles to get
hold of the new earth. It is also the fight between ‘non-philosophy without
a challenge of philosophy’ and ‘a genuine philosophy still alive’. The
fight is over a decisive ideal as seen below.
《It is the only way to decide whether the telos which was inborn in European
humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy──that of humanity which seeks
to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly
from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through
this, its truth and genuine human nature── whether this telos, then,
is merely a factual, historical delusion(……), or whether Greek humanity
was not rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity
as such, its entelechy. To be human at all is essentially to be a human
being in a socially and generatively united civilization; and if man is
a rational being (animal rationale), it is only insofar as his whole civilization
is a rational civilization, that is, one with a latent orientation toward
reason or one openly oriented toward the entelechy which has come to itself,
become manifest to itself, and which now of necessity consciously directs
human becoming.》(‘Crisis’§6)
This description in “the Crisis” is sometimes referred to as Husserl’s
manifestation of philosophical rationalismof extreme European nature. However,
the readers who have thus far grasped the way and motive of Husserl’s
phenomenology must be aware by now that such an understanding rather comes
from a locally and historically restricted view of phenomenology..
Let
me explain a bit more what Husserl tried to say here.
Human society has always developed a faculty of free reason in pursuit
of an essential comprehension of human self and its world (society), wherever
social freedom prevails at a certain level. This may be, in other
words, an infinite movement, in which reason evolves its nature from a
potential state to its very essence. We see its representative example
in Greek philosophy. Modern philosophy, in its beginning, had also
exhibited clearly this ideal of free development of reason. To righteously
identify humans as existence that can grasp themselves and their society,
cope with their problems and overcome their contradictions, altogether
by means of intrinsic reason: this was a fundamental idea of scienceposed
by modern philosophy. This idea however metamorphosed into a mere
science of facts because it was unable to solve the enigma of cognition
problem in a satisfactory way. It depends exactly on the task of founding
a science of essence whether we can reestablish philosophy as a science
for understanding human’s own self and its existence by means of such
intrinsic reason.
I would like to make some more additions to this motive of Husserl.
Modern age is marked by a tendency toward “counter-philosophy”;that is,
a twisted “antipathy” to such words as reason and universality. What
is the nature of human reason referred to by Husserl incidentally? It is
evidently impossible to criticize Husserl’s teaching by a mere anti-logos-centrism
and other reactionary anti-rationalisms.
In the circumstance where society tolerates all kinds of free thoughts,
people always extend their competence of free reasoning or rational way
of thinking in diverse directions. This in turn allows them to thematize
and examine all kinds of questions regarding the world and people. This
infinite evolvement of the competence of reason will enable a truly great
progress in human reason.
It is in fact a process to gradually abolish transcendent items that may
already dominate one’s world view as an authoritative power in any historical
development.
In the history of Europe, it has existed as powers of kings in ancient
empires, and as an absolute divinity in the Christian church. This
world view with a transcendent elementhas necessarily unified the meanings
and values of human life, which in turn has created a dualistic dispute
between absolute authority of knowledge and heretics. It is only the action
of eliminating a unified transcendence in a world view that can tolerate
the true diversity of knowledge and values. A possibility of universality
of knowledge arises exactly from these efforts.
Universalityof knowledge and values should be distinguished from absoluteness
of truth. The latter emerges from an enormous and immovable authority
or power, or from a counter-action to it. Universality of knowledge and
values,on the other hand,arises only from diversity of knowledge and values
and efforts for their “coexistence “and “mutual understanding”.
Universalitycan be developed only when people are aware of diverse meanings
and values in their view of world, and yet ready to go beyond the difference
to maintain and nurture abelief they can share with one another. Where
an overwhelming absoluteness of knowledge and value dominates, the notion
of unique truth thrives, as can been seen in Scholastic philosophy in mediaeval
Europe. The unique truth can exist only as a communal beliefintended to
build an absolute unity. Universality is unable to survive where this absolute
truth exercises its vital power over people and society.
What people have needed to establish a universal knowledge can be perceived
by having a brief look at the approach of natural science. This universal
method of natural science comes into existence at atime when all kinds
of arbitrary fictions for explaining the world are cleared away, any divine
existence or power which authorizes a particular fiction is eliminated,
every culture comes to use only the ideas and conceptions people can share
with each other, and the rational way of reasoning alone prevails at liberty.
Universal knowledge or
belief is not the one shared by a particular community alone, but the one
obtained by using only the rational faculty of reasoning and universalization
every human owns whatever culture or community he or she belongs to.
Modern philosophy was at its outset accompanied by an ideal about knowledge
and value of people and the world that some common belief or understanding
could be attained beyond the barrier of culture, religion and the like. That
is, within the limit of its intrinsic possibility and necessity and only
by means of the competence of universal reason. This idea was justifiable
in itself. Modern human science however failed to know the difference
between the objects of physical science and those of human science and
confused them with each other, and this has given rise to a fatal crisis
concerning universal knowledge. It means that modern human science (mental
science by Husserl) failed to dismantle and remove the transcendent element,
i.e. an idea of absolute entirety of an objective existence, an ideal of
the world as it is in itself.
What is required to reinstate the initial ideal of sciencein modern Europe?
Where can we find the conditionsby which a broadly acceptable universal
common belief is established? Where is the boundary, beyond which we may
step into the world of metaphysical fiction, say, pre-constitution, ultimate
origin, absoluteness. This is exactly why Husserl’s phenomenology is a
theory not for giving a foundation of objective knowledge but for analysis
of belief- structure.
Such a vision for universal human science regarding human knowledge and
values is the key idea of philosophy contemplated by Husserl, which is
definitely worth repeated extensive studies.
Finally let me quote some of Husserl’s texts most characteristic of the
phenomenological method as an analysis of belief -structure and give my
own word-by-word interpretation of those texts.
《……Phenomenological idealism does not deny the actual existence of the
real world (in the first place, that means nature), as if it maintained
that the world were mere semblance, to which natural thinking and the positive
sciences would be subject, though unwittingly. Its sole task and accomplishment
is to clarify the sense of this world, precisely the sense in which everyone
accepts it-and rightly so-as actually existing. That the world exists,
that it is given as existing universe in uninterrupted experience which
is constantly fusing into universal concordance, is entirely beyond doubt.
But it is quite another matter to understand this indubitability which
sustains life and positive science and to clarify the ground of its legitimacy.
In this regard, it is a fundamental of philosophy, according to the expositions
in the text of the Ideas, that the continual progression of experience
in this form of universal concordance is a mere presumption, even if a
legitimately valid one, and that consequently the non-existence of the
world ever remains thinkable, notwithstanding the fact that it was previously,
and now still is, actually given in concordant experience.
The result of the phenomenological sense-clarification of the mode of being
of the real world, and of any conceivable real world at all, is that only
the being of transcendental subjectivity has the sense of absolute being,
that only it is "irrelative" (i.e., relative only to itself),
whereas the real world indeed is but has an essential relativity to transcendental
subjectivity, due, namely, to the fact that it can have its sense as being
only as an intentional sense-formation of transcendental subjectivity.》 (‘Ideas’
Epilogue 5 translated by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer)
(decoding)〈The way of phenomenological thinking has nothing to do with
denying this real world exists. Certainly, phenomenology takes an
approach that it does not presume the existence of real or object world
and instead “brackets” it for the moment. However, it does not insist
at all that the real world is merely an appearance or that natural or positive
science supposes only an appearance as real existence.
Phenomenology adopts the view of idealism methodically, i.e., deliberately,
for the purpose of examining how the meaning of this world is given to
us in the first place. Specifically, no one is able to logically prove
that the world exists in reality. This has troubled many philosophers in
the form of the enigma of cognition, which has not been answered yet. Faced
with this question, phenomenology now comes up with a solution: Instead
of proving that the real world exists in certainty, it examines why we
all have no doubt about the existence of this world and why this belief
of the world is associated with such a firm and necessary ground.
Needless to say, whatever suspicious person he or she may be, nobody doubts
that the world certainly exists. This fact is however separate from
the philosophical task to examine the “ground” for this unquestionability,
which is vitally important in the philosophical point of view.
We can briefly paraphrase it as follows. We are unable to suspect the reality
of this world so long as the world within our experience continues to exist
in a certain continuously coordinated harmony. In effect, it is most unlikely
that this continuously coordinated harmony is lost in our daily experience. This
is why we firmly believe that the world outside exists in reality.
It is however merely our implicit belief which remains in us on condition of such a continuous harmony. It must be clear to everybody that, philosophically, there is no guarantee that this harmony stays with us permanently intact.
According to the teaching of phenomenology, what remains with us as absolutely
unquestionable is only our individual consciousness experience itself.
Our belief of the existence of the world or different things arising from
this experience in principle remains relative and is always accompanied
by questionability. Belief of existence of the world and things can be
phenomenologically considered as part of a network of meanings developed
from our consciousness experiences.〉(by Takeda)
The afterword in Ideas is
concluded by the following impressive description.
《Yet, in the last analysis, my book will be unable to help anyone who
is already certain of his philosophy and his philosophical method and hence
has never come to know the despair of one to whom the misfortune befell
of being in love with philosophy and who, as a beginning student, amidst
the jumble of philosophies, had to make a choice and became aware that there really was no choice at all,………
…since none of those philosophies were concerned with genuine presuppositionlessness
and none had arisen out of the radicalism of an autonomous self-responsibility,
the radicalism philosophy itself demands. In the present time is the situation
much different? Anyone who believes he can appeal to the fruitful bathos
of experience in the usual sense, or to the "sure results" of
the exact sciences, or to experimental or physiological psychology, or
to a constantly improving logic and mathematics, etc., and who believes
he can find there philosophical premises, such a one will not be very receptive
to my book, especially if he, in the grip of the scientific skepticism
of our times, has altogether ceased to accept as valid the goal of a philosophy
as rigorous science.
Thus he will be unable to muster the intensive interest required, and he
will not consider worthwhile the great pains and expenditure of time that
are demanded for an understanding, in my footsteps, of this beginning way
as I have sketched it out. Only someone who is himself struggling with
the beginning of philosophy will react differently, for he will be forced
to say to himself: tua res agitur.》 (Epilogue 7)
(decoding by Takeda)〈As is seen from the above discussion, this text
will help none of those people who are already so certain about their philosophy
and philosophical method that they have no motive or reason for radically
suspecting them ; those who have never had such an unhappy experience that,
once fascinated by the philosophical approach which seems to penetratingly
explore the basis of things, they then become deeply disappointed to find
that there is no true and thoroughgoing basis for things established yet
; and those who have never encountered, already in the beginning of philosophical
studies, the question of how to deal with the conflicting conditions where
diverse philosophical teachings or beliefs dispute each other for no particular
convincing reasons.
This question regarding true basis for philosophy does not appear to find
a proper progress in its attempt to answer the question to this day. Some
people are quite certain that they can cope with this question of possibility
of knowledge by means of accumulated achievements in the disciplines of
precise positive science including natural science, physiology and psychology,
or by means of the exact analytical approach in contemporary logic and
mathematics. It might be difficult for those people to accept my motif
discussed in this book. No doubt it is also the case for those people
who are stuck in that prevailing skepticism and contend that there is no
such a thing as exact and universal knowledge.
Those people have no reason from the beginning to doubt the theory which
they happened to adopt, or have never seriously contemplated such a question
as universality of knowledge. The question I am trying to raise here will
be received, I believe, only by those who are ready to fathom the radical
essence of philosophy and to understand the significance of the question
of beginning, as their own problem.〉
TAKEDA Seiji'sOfficial Homepage
