Complete Decoding by S. TAKEDA
TAKEDA Seiji'sOfficial Homepage
●TOC
The thinking process of lectures --The steps of thinking of
lectures
A The first
stage of phenomenological consideration
B The second stage of phenomenological consideration
C Three stages of phenomenological consideration
LECTURE I
1 The natural attitude in thinking and science of the natural sort
2 The philosophic (reflective) attitude in thinking
3 The contradictions of reflection on cognition,
when one reflects in the natural attitude
4 The dual task of true criticism of
cognition
5 True criticism of cognition as phenomenology of
cognition
6 The new dimension belonging to philosophy; its
peculiar method in contrast to science
LECTURE II
1 The beginning of the critique of cognition Treating as questionable every knowing
2 Reaching the ground of absolute certainty in
pursuance of Descartes’ method of doubt
3 The things that are absolutely given
4 Review and amplification: refutation of the
argument against the possibility of a critique ofcognition
5 The riddle of natural cognition: transcendence
6 Distinction between the two concepts of
immanence and transcendence
7 The initial problem of the critique of
cognition: the possibility of transcendent cognition
8 The principle of epistemological reduction
LECTUREⅢ
1 The carrying out of the epistemological reduction: bracketing everything
transcendent.
2 Theme of the investigation: the pure phenomenon.
3 The question of the "objective
validity" of absolute phenomenon.
4 The impossibility of limiting ourselves to
singular data: phenomenological
cognition as cognitionof essences.
5 Two senses of the concept of the a priori.
LECTUREⅣ
1 Extension of the sphere of investigation through
a consideration of intentionality
2 The self-givenness of
the universal: the philosophical method of the analysis of essence.
3 Critique of the interpretation of evidence as
feelings: Evidence as self-givenness
4 No limitation on the sphere of genuine immanence: the theme of all self-givenness.
LECTUREⅤ
1 The cognition of time- consciousness
2 Apprehension of essences as an evident givenness of essence: the constitution of the individual essence and of
the consciousness of universality
3 Categorical date
4 The symbolically thought as such
5 The field of research in its widest extent: The
constitution of different modes of objectivity incognition : The
problem of the correlation of cognition and the object of cognition
A The first stage of
phenomenological consideration.
Firstly, as long
as no fundamental principle of the possibility of knowledge has ever been
settled,there could be a doubt‘can a fundamental theory of
knowledge be possible in the first place?’ Howeverthere is some
potentiality about the theory. Despite the principle of knowledge being in
doubt, it’s notto say that not all
knowledge is denied.
After all, in order to establish the fundamental theory of knowledge
we should first secure the sphereof certainty of more
basic knowledge. To that end it is proper, to begin with, to focus on‘the
caseexamples which
are absolutely indubitable
As things being so, we
should set the idea of cogito by Descartes as our starting point. For theexistence of‘cogitatio’ (act of thinking) itself is‘indubitable’.
What is the ground when we say‘thinking (cogitatio)
is absolutely given’? And also what is theground when we say
knowledge is doubtful. I try to put forth, for the present, the paired
conception of‘immanent-transcendent’.
What we call cognitive object is‘transcendent’ which is always accompaniedby dubitability. On the contrary,‘cogitatio’ (thinking), which is directly given, is an intuition with noroom for doubt. This
is‘immanent’.
This‘immanent’ is often interpreted as‘really being
immanent’, but that is a mistake. When we saythat thinking is‘immanent’ and directly given, the givenness does
not mean the‘fact’ of the
existence ofsome object in the
naturalistic sense. We need to distinguish
between‘there being given or existing something in consciousness’, namely‘existing immanent’ and the‘immanent’ in the sense of‘something giving itself to consciousness asevidence’, namely,‘the evidence as
self givenness’. The former
means that it is given and exists as anobject itself.
However, we still now don’t
have clear distinction between these two kinds of immanence’.(⇒thesetwo mean‘noesis’ and‘noema’ .)
Therefore, in the first
stage, everything which really‘inheres’ is said to be indubitable. Here weshould start from this
standpoint and step forward to executing phenomenological reduction, therebyput all positing of transcendent objects in‘epoche’. That is
because we need to grasp clearly how thetranscendent
appears to us as cognitive object. Inquiring the possibility of a‘meeting’ means exactly toclarify in
what way the transcendent becomes valid to us.
The
key is to grasp the essential way in which objects are given to intuition
within ourconsciousness.
Therefore, in this method the way of thinking of natural science and of
traditionalscience are
completely useless.[helpless]
We
often mix-up and confuse the method of grasping essence with that of natural
knowledge andend up in failure.
But the difference between them is fundamental. 《We
say that phenomenological reduction means to understand all of the transcendent
with theindex of zero, That is,
to posit it, without recognizing its real existence or validity, merely as thevalidity of a phenomenon.》
B The second stage of phenomenological consideration
We now know that what is absolutely given are not
what we call‘objects’, but
only pure‘phenomenon’ which was
reduced. Neither objects of the
world nor psyche or‘ego’ in
the commonsense is given in
itself. Therefore, we shouldn’t
rely on psychology or descriptive psychology.
So we raise a root
question in terms of‘How can pure cognitive phenomenon fit in with what
doesnot inhere in itself?’ In other words, why
something which does not inhere existentially can stand as acognitive object, or why subject as the immanent does agree with
object as‘the transcendent’.
We may see that phenomenology could aptly solve
this problem, but things do not go as easy as weexpect at first. How can
purely given phenomena give rise to objects as‘the transcendent’？
In order to explain
that, it is insufficient just to arrange and describe the sphere of this‘phenomenon’logically.
Rather, I would say the method of‘Ideation’ (grasping and describing the phenomenon ofconsciousness in
terms of a structure of essence) is helpful. By this method, we can grasp and
organizethe objects, which
are given intuitively as phenomenon, not as existential objects but as objects
ofessence.
Grasping in this sense, the meaning of the evidence of Cartesian cogito becomes
clearer. Whatis given directly in
consciousness (as intuition) is itself an object, not of existence but of
essence, andthere is an assured
validity and legitimacy in its givenness.
Now we can secure the sphere of‘objectivity’ in a new sense, which is
different from theobjectivity of so-called existential objects, namely, that of‘objectivity
of essence.’ It will establish thesphere of bringing the‘self givenness’ of things, which occurs in consciousness as intuition, intoexpression; the sphere of‘the expression of essence’.
Let’s get going on the
next subject. Here we see the question of two kinds of‘Immanent’suggested above.
We now understand that there is a difference between‘being
given absolutely’ and‘inhering existentially’.
From this, the distinction of something as‘what is
given absolutely’ andsomething as‘what is given existentially’ (⇒It means the distinction of noema and noesis. )
As a consequence, the definition of
phenomenological reduction becomes more assured, the meaningclearer. The
sphere of phenomenological exploration, which is quite different from any other
scientificspheres in the
past, is the sphere in which we examine the way objects are absolutely given.
Therefore, no matter how the traditional objective essential sphere is
seen as doubtful, this spherecan be held valid. This
is the sphere in which we should put the matter [event] into shape, which isoccurring purely
and absolutely in the field of our consciousness. Namely, the‘absolute
givenness’ ofthe matter in the
field.
C Three stages of
phenomenological consideration [investigation].
Then, let’s go on to the
next subject. The consideration of essence does not merely mean generallygrasping
something which actually inheres consciousness and confirming the essential
relations.
Regardless of the mere outlook of it,‘cogitatio’ is not directly given. Take sound for
example. At firstsound seems to be given
as itself. However, when we closely look at that, we find there’s
a complicatedrelationship
between the appearing and the appeared.
To put it another way, a collocation of sound
means‘the appeared’ and is
something different from‘the appearing’ (what is
just now appearing). Or, we can say a continuous sound and one short
sound.
How should we thing about it?
What
is described above shows us that there are two types of‘absolute givenness’,‘noesis’ (theappearing) and‘noema’ (the appeared).‘Noesis’ means something which is really given but‘noema’ isnot really given.
That is, let’s say, something constituted.
To naive consciousness, or intuitional perception,
phenomenon seems something which is simpleand has no
distinction. Or, we would say, the distinction seems to be there as an order of
objectiveexistence in the
event itself. However, the phenomenological analysis tells us that, even in an
intuitionwhich is seen as
simple, there are various kinds of distinctions.
When we look closely at the experience of the intuition of events
with phenomenological method, wecan find that the
various objects we own mean something which is given as an object or somethingconstituted. ‘Given object’ is, in a sense, something which is absolutely given to
consciousness but notsomething which is‘really’ given. ‘Appearing
object’ (noema) is not a part
of‘the appearing’ and‘the appearing’ does not mean itsreplacement. That
two are in an absolutely inseparable relationship.
Thus, the method of phenomenological reduction discloses a wondrous correlationship of‘cognitivephenomenon’ and‘cognitive object’ in cognition. Now, we shall have the next task to reflect thatcorrelationship which
represents itself in consciousness (thinking) in detail and bring it into
essentialdescription.
The objects of cognition are diverse not only in the sorts of
consciousness; perception, imagination andmemory, which gives
objects but also in the objectivity of objects such as conception, ideas,
values.Phenomenological reduction should go after, step by step, how they
are given to consciousnessaccording to the
diversity of objective cognition and bring about their validity.
In this process, we can elucidate the enigma of epistemology
completely, make full scale of cognitivecriticize
possible and achieve to set the most fundamental ground of all knowledge and
sciences for thefirst time.
LectureⅠ
1-1 Natural attitude of thinking and the science of natural attitude
We have so far divided science into that of‘natural attitude’ and‘philosophical attitude’. Let’s lookat this in detail. (⇒Here,‘science of natural attitude means positivistic natural
science.)
Sciences of natural
attitude are generally unaware of the question of‘cognitive
criticize’; in whatconditions correct cognition can be possible. It
takes the attitude of analyzing datum gained fromsensory
intuition (sensory perception) by reason, cognizing various events as facts.
Perception becomesthe basis of the
method because we can confirm how things and events exist as it is by seeing,
touchingand hearing
them. We also accumulate the
descriptions about the change, mutual relations and lawsof the events and
gradually build up the overall picture of the natural world.
Reasoning from directly perceived and confirmed affairs, and making a specific
classification, andafter that applying the
universal classification to individual events and modifying the classification
inreversed
operations, we always go on organizing and expanding that overall specific
classification.
However, in natural science there appear contradictions among these various
kinds ofclassifications and
divisions in the process of those operations, and there also occur conflicts
regardingthe principle and
ground of the classifications (fault of reasoning, miscalculation, the failure
of properclassification and so
on). In this case various definitions and the ground of explications are
examined,and weak ones are
displaced with new ones, which should be recognized as generally valid until adoubt in another form
emerges.
Naturalistic science is advancing in this way in
general, and gradually extending its domain andexactness. That
is, knowledge of naturalistic science is gradually conquering the wider sphere
of thereal world. We should
take notice that for naturalistic science in the first place the real world is,regarding its existence, considered as‘self
evident’ . What is at issue here is not about its real
existenceitself but about the
diversity of the ways of existence, elements, change, relations and the laws
whichpenetrate them.
And what is more important is, such a basic method of‘science
of natural attitude’ likethis has become the
main method of the spheres of natural science of physical things, living
things,and mathematics
(although in the sphere of mathematics, the main theme is not diversity orconceptions of the real world but the world of‘the
ideal’ which is regarded as being in-itself.)
Thus, in the sphere of the science of‘naturalistic
attitude’ contradictions and conflicts appear invarious
aspects, but they are gradually settled in the ways seen above. In such a way
the domain ofknowledge of the
world is to be extended in general. It is also important that these
modifications andprogress of knowledge
in the sciences of natural attitude are being made in such a way as if the realworld which exists as
self evident is always encouraging us to know it exactly as it is.
1-2 Philosophical (reflective) attitude of thinking
Next, we shall compare the attitudes of
naturalistic science and philosophical attitude.
In philosophical
attitude the relationship between an object and its knowledge is reflectivelyexamined. As a
result there appears a big difficulty. On the contrary, in naturalistic
way of thinking,as natural science
has been accumulating its achievements step by step, the reality of objects
alreadycognized and
the cognitive possibility of objects yet to be cognized are seen as
self-evident. Here,there’s no reason for the possibility of cognition in
general to be at issue and to be reconsidered. Thecognition itself is, here, put under consideration as an object of‘natural
investigation’. Cognition isregarded as a
natural fact along with other events and affairs, and becomes the object of
scientificresearch, for
example, as the experience of organic being which cognizes, namely as a
psychologicalfact. That is, how‘cognition’ generates and evolves in‘mind’, and so on.
Looking at it from another view point, cognition
means the cognition of objectivity (namely, thecognition of the
order of the meaning of an object). However, here again, natural way of
thinkinggrasps it as the science
of forms and laws in which the meaning and its order are understood. This islogic. Logic makes up,
in line with that main theme, the fields of grammatology, pure logic,
regulatorylogic, practical logic
and so on.
However, be
it psychology or logic whatever, here the question of cognition is thought as one
of thenaturalistic
sciences. What is important is the point that cognition means‘the
cognition of objectivity’.In other words, the most central point of the question of the
possibility of cognition lies in thecorrelationship between cognitive experience and the cognitive object or its meaning.
1-3 Contradictions of cognitive reflection in naturalistic views
Whatever cognition it may be, cognition is a mental experience,
namely cognition of‘a cognizingsubject’. And facing the subject there corresponds
something to be cognized, namely‘object’. Thus thequestion is:
How can‘subject’ confirm the agreement between its‘cognition’ and‘object’
outside of itself?
Natural way of thinking never meets this kind of question. Here,
cognition and cognitive object aretacitly
thought to be in agreement or ought to be in agreement. However, in
philosophical thinking,there appears the very
question of if the agreement is really given to us. (⇒Descartes
first raised thatquestion)For example, when we
perceive something, what exactly guarantees that our perception is the rightperception of the
object? Perception merely means an
experience of cognitive subject in every respect.Various kinds of thinking based on that perception also mean my
subjective act of thinking. How in theworld does my
experience know that there exists not only my perception and my thinking but
alsoobjective entity
which is to be cognized?
Should we think that only appearance is given to a cognizer
and object itself can never be given tous? (⇒like
Kantian idea) Or should we think that only‘ego’ exists for certain and all the rest are mereappearance. That
is to say, is the standpoint of solipsism the only way which is left to us?
Or again, should we say, like Hume, that all of
the objective world can be explainedpsychologically and
logically it can never be verified. I would like to say none of those answers
can besatisfied. In the first place, even this psychological
theory of Hume, in fact, seems to go beyond theboundary of the immanent sphere of‘subject’. Hume tried to reduce‘impression’ and‘idea’ into ourinner fiction, while he tacitly presupposes some real existence
surpassing‘subject’, in terms of‘custom’,‘humanity’ and‘sensory
organ’.
However, is there any meaning in the skeptic
criticize of cognition which points out the variouscontradictions, when,
in the first place, the ground of logic itself is put under question. For example,
astring of biological
thinking claims that human beings, accommodating to nature in the battle forsurvival, have
been evolving their body and intelligence. If it is true, could we not think that logicalsystems and
laws of humans could be completely different from as they are now? If that should be thecase, could we not say
that cognition of humans is, in all respect, determined by a particular way andform of human cognition and intelligence, so it cannot cognize the‘object’ of the world properly?
However, there also appears a contradiction in such an idea. That is
because in the view of‘every cognition is relative’, pointing out the contradictions of other theories and proving them
asfallacies, we can see the tacit idea that‘the
law of contradiction’ is absolutely valid. As this exampleshows, the question of
the possibility of cognition has long created a lot of riddles in every
quarter.
Science of natural attitude, normally not meeting that question of
cognition, thinks that everything isclear and
understandable. But once facing this question there appears millions of riddles
here. Thus,human reason is always
exposed to the danger of falling into the various kinds of skepticisms byattempting to
solve those logical contradictions.
1-4 The twofold challenges in the true
science of cognitive criticize
The question of cognition has long been a stage
full of contradictions like this. The first task weshould go after is a
criticize one. While criticize the na?ve
fallacy in which natural attitude lapses, wehave to criticize and
refute, too, the various kinds of skeptic absurdity which comes from that
fallacy.
The second task is more essential and positive.
That is, by clarifying the essence of cognition, toelucidate the enigma about the meaning of cognition and its‘object’ which has long been the maintheme of modern
epistemology. Furthermore the task includes, while classifying in a proper way
theessences of the
meaning of cognitive objects in general, therewith to clarify the meaning of
the mainformality. That
is to say, the forms of ontological, predicational,
metaphysical and so on. (⇒ it meansthe clear
comprehension of the essential relationship among the fields of positive
science, logic andphilosophy. )
Philosophical epistemology has to solve the task
just mentioned above. Thereby it can be anessential
science which criticizes the naturalistic cognition of all kinds of sciences.
Philosophicalepistemology, here,
gains the ground of essentially interpreting the meaning of the achievements ofnatural
science. That is because the question of agreement stemming from reflection on
the naturalcognition has
long been causing serious confusion in modern philosophy, and in consequence
has beencreating the
various completely fallacious ideas about cognition. These fallacious ideas
haveinterpreted the
cognition of natural science in various terms of materialistic, spiritualistic,
dualistic,psychomonistic and
positivistic ways.
But in fact, essential epistemology of philosophy
first makes it possible to separate the science ofnatural
thinking and philosophy, and thereby clarify that the ontology of natural
attitude (how thingsexist) can be established
on the basis of philosophical epistemology.
The central theme of philosophy consists, as it
were, in the science of being (entities) in anabsolute sense.
It comes from the essential critique, the critique of natural attitude in each
particularscience.
Universal critique of cognition elucidates the essential relationship between
cognizing andobject, and on that basis‘metaphysic’ as‘essential science of being’ can be set up. (⇒Here, Husserluses the term‘metaphysic’ not in the meaning
of a traditional philosophy seeking fundamentalprinciple and
ultimate cause.)
1-5 True criticism of cognition as phenomenology of cognition
Disregarding any metaphysical purposes of the
critique of cognition, when we confine ourselves tothe task of
clarifying the essence of the problem of cognition, the science of the critique
of cognitionmust be‘phenomenology’ of
cognition and of being cognized, and it will be the first and principle part ofphenomenology. Here,
phenomenology means above all a method and attitude of specific philosophicalthinking.
In
contemporary philosophy, it has become almost commonplace that there must be
only onemethod of cognition in
all science as well as philosophy. This idea derives from the starting point ofmodern philosophy in the
17th century. In fact philosophy set up its method in pursuance of the methodof exact science, above all mathematic and other mathematical
natural sciences.
And in our times it is still a prevailing idea that the method of
philosophy as the primaryontology and
theory of science not only deeply relates to other sciences but also can be
grounded byother sciences, in the
same way in which other sciences are grounded on one another [each other?]. Infact the idea that
philosophical theory of cognition can be grounded on psychology and biology was
infashion for a
period of time. And today there is a kind of reaction against that idea.
1-6 The new dimension belonging to
philosophy; its peculiar method in contrast to science
To be sure, in sciences of natural sort it can be the case that
sciences of different kinds give theirgrounds to
each other. But in the sphere of
philosophy, it’s not the case. For philosophy is always inneed of a completely
new starting point and an entirely new method distinguishing it in principle
fromnatural
science because philosophy should include the fundamental science of the
critique of cognitionabove mentioned. And
that new method must be the one distinguishing itself from the science ofnatural sort.
For that very reason philosophy starting from the essential critique of
cognition cannotmake use of the
various methods and the achievements of natural science, rather has to ignore
all ofthem.
For the present, we shall consider the following point.
Even in skeptical critique of cognition prior to essential philosophical
critique of cognition, variouskinds of scientific
methods of natural sort have been in question of its validity. Here, since not
onlyscientific views
but also in particular the accomplishments of exact science (e.g. mathematics)
arethought
doubtful as far as the agreement of subject and object is concerned, they
cannot be the groundof the fundamental
reflection of the question of cognition. Therefore the question of how our
cognition＝subject can reach the object is left over as that
which an answer cannot be figured out in a positiveway.
There
appears a new question of how the right method of cognition, the validity of
cognition canbe assured or how
the right one and the fallacious one can be distinguished as unsolvable. Along
withthat there also
appears the difficult question of the cognitive objectivity in itself. Whether
it is possibleor not that the
object ever be cognized? Or, even if it has not been and never will cognized,
can it havethe right to be
cognized in principle, namely can it be perceived, represented and described in
someway?
We should know that by using the cognitive
presuppositions based on the natural cognitions thereis no avail to solve
the question of cognition above seen. Once the agreement of subject and object
isput under question,
as far as the method of natural science is based on the presupposition of theagreement, it is
very clear that we cannot extract the fundamental views from this sphere to
solve thatquestion. The
same are the cases of exact mathematics and mathematical natural sciences.
It is then clear that there can be no such talk
as that philosophy has to model itself after the basicmethod and the cognitive
idea which exact science has accumulated, and succeed and complete itmethodologically. Once again, for the reason mentioned
above philosophy has to stand on acompletely new
dimension in contrast to every method of cognition of natural sort. Or, it has
to once setup itself as an
entirely contradictive method to that of the sciences of natural sort. Those
who canunderstand the
significance of the critique of cognition and the difficulty of this task must
support thisview.
LectureⅡ
2-1 Treating questionable: every knowing
Now, our task is the essential critique of
cognition. Before starting it, what we should keep in mindis we have to set
aside various cognitive views and ideas which so far human beings have found.
Then where should we set the starting point? The aim of the science of
the critique of cognition liesin elucidating‘the essence of cognition’,
to be more precise, ascertaining how to define the conceptionsthe relationship of
cognition and its objectivity, the trueness, validity and agreement of
cognition.
‘The suspension of judgment-epoche’ does not mean to doubt all of the traditional human knowledge,therefore even
cognition of the critique of cognition, and after all, to persist to the
attitude of doubt tothe end. Rather, as
long as the science of the critique of cognition has to thoroughly examine thepresupposition of
traditional cognition, it should set up the first point of its departure all by
itselfwithout
relying on any established views and authorities of the world knowledge.
The first cognition which is a starting point, therefore, must be
something which is completely immunefrom the implicit doubtfulness (unclearness) with
which all the traditional cognition is necessarilyaccompanied. The unclearness of cognition is deeply
related to the question of in what relationshipan existence being cognized and the existence‘in-itself’ is. That is the very
reason that we cannotstart from any premises
of traditional cognition about the existence.
What we need to do is,
nevertheless, to find something that can be denied by no one as an absolutegivenness and
indubitable, and to start from this point.
2-2 Reaching the ground of absolute certainty in pursuance of
Descartes’ method of doubt.
Descartes tried the similar attempt regarding the starting point of
philosophical thinking. He claimedthat after doubting all of existence, the existence of‘I’ which is doubting everything is left as absolutelyindubitable at the end. It is no less the case with
the conception of‘cogitatio’ (intentionality ofconsciousness).
Various things I perceive, represent, judge and value and here I know that
thereappear various kinds of
uncertainty, doubt and error. Nevertheless, I am also clearly aware that theexisting
perceptions of this uncertainty, doubt and error are absolutely indubitable. In a similar way,in the cases of
representation and judgment, even the judgment is obscure or uncertain, the
fact thatnow I have the act of
that judgment is absolutely and certainly given to us.
Descartes’
considerations were made for other purposes. But we can use them here, with
somemodifications. The
key point is that the act of thinking, which I’m now executing, of
perception,imagination,
judgment and valuation is, insofar as I am reflecting and directly receiving
them with mypure intuition,‘absolutely given’ to me.
For example, I can speak about, in a vague
fashion, my own perception, imagination, experience,judgment and so
on; but then, when I reflect on them with clear awareness, all that is said to
be given─speaking about in a vague fashion itself─immediately becomes‘an absolutely given
experience’.
That is the case with not only actual perception but also memory or
imagination of some perception. Inthe latter, the
perception is given, not as a vivid present but as a perception which is
recalled orimagined.
Now, I have put the act
of perception and the act of reflection of imagination on the same level; butwe should start, in
pursuance of Descartes, with the most basic and the absolute givenness ofperception.
2-3 The
sphere of the things that are absolutely given.
We can put the
above mentioned more briefly that every mental process is not only experienced
butreflectively apprehended as the object of pure‘seeing’ and pure apprehension (under the clearawareness); and
here the mental process is said to be absolutely given to us. (as the absolutegivenness)
On
reflection of our own experience, we can think and see what kind of experience
it is, whatrelationship it has
with other experiences, in what way it is given and so on. That thinking andjudgment is
made in such a way that it always goes back to the absoluteness of ongoing
experiencenow being reflected.
For instance, having a
mental process of a perception, I can‘see’
or inspect the perception itselfreflectively, and grasp its‘givenness’, intrinsic character, and meaning. (⇒In
IDEAS, Husserl executedthis phenomenological
reflection in particular detail and extracted the conceptions and structures ofvivid evidence,
adumbration, actual-potential, halo of background intuition, cogitatio-cogitatum,immanence-transcendence and so
on.) Not only
the mental process of a perception but also some‘specific formation
of thinking’(conceptual meaning designated by objects) is, as long as I am‘seeing’ that kind of object reflectively,absolutely given
to me.
When
we‘see’ our own perception,
imagination, judgment and thinking reflectively, they areimmediately and
absolutely given to us. For that reason we can discern the acts of perception,imagination,
judgment and thinking as different ones, and give words to their
characteristics in adistinctive way
(or extract the essences of them). Otherwise, there would be nothing to be absolutelygiven to us.
Thus, as seen above, we
have now defined the sphere of‘the absolute givenness’. And this must bethe starting point of
the science of the critique of cognition. The essential science of the critique
ofcognition doesn’t
reduce the fact of cognition into psychological fact, and doesn’t decide the naturalconditions of the
possibility of cognition. What we should take notice again is that the critical
science ofcognition is not
the science of defining the fact of cognition as the positivistic science but
that ofelucidating the‘essence’ of cognition.
2-4 Review and amplification: refutation of the argument against the
possibility of a critique ofcognition
Let’s confirm what has been observed above. The science of natural sort doesn’t worry about theserious
problem of epistemology, as it has a strong confidence of the agreement between
cognition(subject) and its correlate (object).
However, once finding the difficulty in the form of the variousconflicts of
cognition and theories, it becomes aware that it has no method to deal with
this problem.Since the science of natural sort presupposes the agreement of
subject-object from the outset, it has noway out of this
difficulty.
That is the very reason that
philosophical science of the critique of cognition is prerequisite. Thepossibility of‘metaphysics’ seeking the
meaning and essence of being lies in how the science of thecritique of
cognition will go. It is clear, however, that critique of cognition cannot make
use of anyestablished
achievement of the science of natural sort, because the critique put the basic
ground of thescience of
natural sort in question. Then, how can the critical science of cognition set
up its startingpoint from the position
of regarding every traditional view as no avail?
I
have already suggested that the critical science of cognition can start from
its own particularcognition
without any ground of traditional knowledge. To put it differently, I showed
the firstcognition which is not involved in the traditional riddle of
cognition as a sphere to be called‘evidence ofcogitatio’
which is absolutely clear and indubitable. Again, I showed the first cognition
as such that amental process reflectively‘seen’
is, whatever kind of process it may be, to be regarded as an‘absolutegivenness; or,
the immanence of cognition is to be seen something absolute no one can doubt.’
I
shall try to argue that the‘immanence of cognition’, immune to the exhaustive doubt ofskepticism, must
be the most basic and necessary starting point of cognition in general, and
thereforethat it is completely
nonsensical for the starting point of the critique of cognition to rely on thetraditional sphere of the‘transcendent’ science such as psychology.
In
connection with that I would like to touch on the logic: as long as all
cognition is riddle and ithas no absolute
ground, the cognition which is to be the starting point of the critique of
cognitioncannot be exempt from
the thoroughgoing doubt. This is clearly a deceptive claim. It is from the
vaguegeneralization of the
wording.‘Cognition in general is in question’ does
not mean that all cognitionmust be denied. [ every question/ all the questions/ all (of the) questions/
all questions must bedenied ?]
Rather, there just appears an important
insoluble riddle. The riddle is, I showed at first, of the‘agreement of subject and object’: how can I confirm that my cognition agrees its object, as long as
noone can go beyond one’s subject＝cognition.
However, if I find an absolutely assured
cognition where no doubt can ever stand, I can make it thefirst step of the
science of the critique of cognition. And you shall see now that‘the
evidence ofimmanent cognition’ is no less that first
cognition.
2-5 The riddle of natural
cognition: transcendence
The most central riddle of the question of the
possibility of cognition lies in, in a word,‘thetranscendence of cognition’. And what all of the
sciences of natural sort regard as truth is the positingof transcendent
object. They think of the posited transcendent as objective existence, and
claim thattheir cognition agrees
the object. We should reexamine that.
2-6 Distinction between the two concepts of
immanence and transcendence
Now I came up with the word‘transcendence’, but the word can be taken by twofold meaning.
Thefirst means that cognitive object is not contained‘genuinely’ in the act of cognition in the mentalprocess. Here, the point of epistemological
question is‘how can the mental process transcend itself?’Or, how can the mental process transcend itself and constitute
object?
I
said the first meaning of‘transcendence’ denotes‘cognitive object is not genuinely given in themental process’. In contrast to that, the second meaning denotes
that: cognition transcends what is inthe true sense given to consciousness’. Again, the first transcendence just
means cognition which isnot genuinely given
in consciousness. The second means cognition which transcends what is given asabsolutely clear givenness. Differently speaking, the first‘immanence’ means what is genuinelycontained (given) in consciousness, the second‘absolutely
clear givenness’ which is
directly given toconsciousness.
Therefore, as to the
question of cognition, in the former case, how can the mental process so to
speaktranscend itself
, the latter, how can cognition posit something as existing which is not
directly andtruly given in it?
Before we develop the
essential critique, the relationship between immanence and transcendence isnot clearly
distinguished. As a result, one who raises the first question‘how
can the mental processtranscend itself and cognize something that is genuinely given?’,
at the same time implicitly raises orincludes in it the second question‘how can cognition
create the cognition which transcends theabsolutely clear givenness?’That is to say, here,
he puts [makes] a tacit presumption: that which is‘genuinely’ contained in theact of cognition is
the only thing which is absolutely given. Therefore, he seems to be doubtful
about allcognition which
is formed as transcendence; but the presumption is a mistake.
2-7 The initial problem
of the critique of cognition: the possibility of transcendent cognition
The conception of‘transcendence’ is construed in either of two senses mentioned above or in anambiguous way; but the question of‘transcendence’ is the central theme of the critique of cognition orthe very entrance of
the universal science of the critique of cognition.
Besides, this question clearly shows why the
transcendent science, the objective sciences cannot beused for the problem
of the critique of cognition. The core of the problem of cognition lies in
that: thecognition
obtained by the objective sciences means the cognition as transcendence but
here it isimpossible for
the transcendent cognition to grasp how it reaches the object as such or how it
knowsitself reaching the
object.
Still
someone might say: surely there’s such a riddle in the
problem of cognition, but even when wecannot exactly tell how
the agreement of subject and object can be possible it is quite certain thatnatural
science has long cognized the natural world as an objective fact. No man with reason willdoubt it, the real
existence of the world. The question of the agreement of subject and object is
arhetorical
question fabricated by skeptics.
Then we
should answer him as follows: no matter how steadfast confidence the objective
sciencemay have, as the
cognition is that of transcendent it is impossible for the cognition to answer
theproblem of the
critique of cognition. Therefore the objective science cannot be the foundation
ofepistemology in the
true sense.
Once again, the
central question of epistemology (the critique of cognition) lies
in that our cognitionmeans, in every respect,‘transcendence’ and that in epistemology‘how can
transcendent cognition bepossible’ is itself a riddle and unsolved. The logic of
objective sciences claims: surely it is a riddle butthe objective
cognition has been acquired in practice therefore the objective cognition is
possible.However we must say the core of the problem remains unsolved
here.
It is very clear
what the objective science is lacking. When the objective science maintains it
surelycognizes‘the transcendent’ that
means‘object’ itself; but in
fact, the object is nothing else than thatwhich is grasped within its‘subject’. As the objective science cannot understand the structural essenceof cognition, the
core of this problem is unclear to it.Again,
putting them in order, the central points are the following: firstly, cognition
and the objectare quite different.
Secondly, as the former is directly given to us the latter is not. Thirdly,
neverthelessthe two items (cognition＝subject and the correlate＝object) must agree. How can we understand thispossibility?
The
answer is that if we directly‘see’ the essential relationship between cognition (subject) andwhat is cognized
(object), we can understand that. Objective sciences don’t
think like that ratherimagine being able to understand the relationship from‘transcendence’ which is acquired. But, ofcourse it is impossible.
If objective
sciences accept the idea I mentioned above, they understand the difficulty in
thequestion of the agreement of subject and object, and recognize their‘objective cognition’ as something‘transcendent’. Then, the
question changes from‘how can objective cognition be
possible?’ to‘why do wecome to think of something‘transcendent’ as objective cognition?’. That is the path
Hume took.
However, setting Hume’s
question aside, we go on to the following consideration to clarify thestructure of the
question above seen.
A man who has inherently no sense of hearing can
understand in his mind that there existsexcellent music
by means of the combination of sounds and harmony, but not how the combination
ofsounds makes harmony and
music. This is because even if he has‘the how’ in his knowledge he doesn’thave it in his direct‘seeing’ or in the form of immediate givenness. In
this case his knowledge of soundand music is the transcendent, and‘the how’ means‘absolute givenness’.
Our main task lies in elucidating the essence of
the relationship between that‘absolute givenness’and‘transcendence’. Although
objective sciences think it possible to cognize the relationship just from‘transcendence’ which is
acquired with no absolute givenness at all, it’s completely impossible.
I repeatedly say that on
this account it is totally negative to solve the essence of the problem ofcognition with
knowledge of objective science. In order to solve the problem there can be no
way otherthan starting from a
completely new idea, a fundamentally different view from the traditional one.
2-8 The principle of epistemological
reduction
I would like to call a
totally new idea‘epistemological reduction’.What we have to notice is that to investigate the
problem further we should be aware of its being notabout the sphere of
facts but about that of the essence of consciousness. That is why theepistemological
reduction is necessary. (⇒ In‘Ideas’ the term is changed into that of‘phenomenological reduction’ or‘transcendental reduction’)‘Epistemological
reduction’ means, in brief, to put the index of
exclusion, indifference and nullity onknowledge as
transcendence, or that of suspending the judgment the authenticity of that
knowledge.
In this sphere of essential theory they often make‘metabasis’ to the other classes. (metabasis→Greek ……transition to other classes. In Husserl, confusing
the different logics.) That
is, they oftenmix up and confuse
the spheres of the actual and ideal, and the real and the essential. This is
the mainreason for the fallacy
in the essential science of the critique of cognition. Although what matters iscognizing the
immanent essence of consciousness in the essential theory of cognition, they
take it forcognizing the
objective fact, and go to nowhere.
LectureⅢ
3-1 The carrying out of the epistemological reduction: bracketing
everything transcendent.
By considerations we have seen above, it has
become clear what is to be used and not used for the grounding of the
essential theory of the critique of cognition. We cannot make use of the
knowledge of the traditional
objective sciences, rather settle the starting point of it only in the whole
sphere of ‘cogitationes’, namely that of the act of consciousness or of immanence of
consciousness. For there exists‘absolute givenness’ in this sphere. We can call the sphere‘pure
phenomenon’, which are events occurring in our
consciousness in such a way that everyone has to recognize the certainty.
Epistemological reduction that I have already
mentioned means a method to extract the essence of this‘ pure phenomenon’, thereby we prevent ourselves from confusing the‘evidence of cogitatio’
itself (absolute givenness in consciousness) with the‘evidence of cogitatio of
thinking existence (sum cogitans). That is to say, we have to make clear
distinction between phenomenological ‘I’ and psychological‘I’, the former of which we should call‘pure phenomenon’. Of‘psychological‘I’,
we say‘I think therefore I am’ or
we think that‘with thinking‘I’ there exist my judgment, cognition, emotion and so on’. To put it another way, here
the various acts of cogito in consciousness are thought to be things which
are objectively and actually existent in objective time.
’I’,‘my consciousness’ and‘the act of my consciousness’ are altogether
psychological facts. Or we should call it, phenomenologically, the
cognition already grasped as‘transcendence’. As long as the essential theory
of the critique of cognition has the main task of elucidation, the essential
relationship between‘transcendence’ and‘immanence’, the notion of‘my mind’,‘my
consciousness’ as a psychological fact
must be bracketed or parenthesized in advance.
3-2 Theme of investigation: The pure phenomenon
Now we have clearly seen the reason for the
suspension of judgment of all kinds of transcendent knowledge. Once
taking the view point of‘reduction’, even‘self’,‘I’, or my perception which is thought as objectively existent in the world means‘transcendence’, namely a conviction constituted. The phenomenological view
point of the critique of cognition stops the self-evident presupposition of the
objective world that means natural‘transcendence’ (of‘I’ and the
objective world), therefore how it [‘transcendence’] is
constituted must be the very object of philosophical investigation.
Assuming
phenomenological attitude, namely suspending the presupposition of the
certainty of objective existence and removing any‘doxa’, then‘seeing’
inner essence of consciousness in terms of ‘what is given as it is in itself’. That means we extract how the various kinds of objective cognition
are constituted in the
sphere of pure phenomenon, the immanence of consciousness. We call that point
of view‘phenomenological reduction’ (傍線部英語本文確認)
However, if we want not to run aground on this
shore and to gain a firm foothold on land, we should take new steps and
have more consideration because there are a lot of difficulties and puzzles
hidden behind. What we have
observed above is the consideration taken from the view point of the critique
of cognition,
which, if properly applied, holds for every kind of phenomenon beyond the mere
framework of the critique of
cognition.
The philosophical ground on this problem that I
have so far set up is securing the sphere of ‘absolute givenness’ and starting from this point. But there must appear doubt about the
certainty of this foothold or the
possibility of, if only to a slight degree, containing not absolute givenness. In order to clear the doubt we must confine the problem in the sphere of‘pure
phenomenon’, namely the sphere of the seeing of‘absolute givenness’ or the sphere of‘pure consciousness’.
Once more, we cannot
start from‘transcendence’. Since objective cognition is‘transcendence’, there is no object
actually given in our consciousness correspondent to the cognition. However, as
long as we are in fact building
up a lot of objective cognition, be it scientific knowledge or natural one,
what matters lies in the‘transcendence of cognition’, namely‘how does objective cognition
having no absolute givenness form itself as a
validity (or conviction)?’ I have to say that with regard to the validity of‘objective cognition’,
there must occur something, within the sphere of‘pure
phenomenon’, correspond to the
cognition.
《reaching
the object of this relation to transcendent things, still it has something
which can be grasped in the pure phenomenon》
Thus, we come to understand in every point that the sphere of‘pure
phenomenon’ or‘immanence is
the fundamental sphere
for the problem of cognition. Cognition means‘transcendence’. (⇒a conviction or faith which was
constituted according to the conditions in consciousness) It is decisive to understand the essence of
structure of consciousness for elucidating the ground of the serious confusion
or conflict in the scientific
theories. Therefore, there’s no other correct starting point than‘pure phenomenon’, which is the fundamental sphere where‘absolute givenness’ is actually given and‘transcendence’ as such is currently
constituted.
3-3 The pure phenomenon. The question of the‘objective validity’ of the absolute
phenomenon.
Thus, here, phenomenology is aimed at the
essential theory of‘pure phenomenon’ or of‘pure cognition. However, there, we are also faced with a
difficulty. In the first place,‘does not all science lead to the establishing
of objects existing in themselves, i.e., to transcendent object?’ (⇒ does not any science seek to
confirm the real existence of the cognitive object, and thence, to gain the
right knowledge of the
object?) If that should be the case, does the confirmation of the objectivity
of the cognitive object
belong to the essence of science, on which the universal validity of science
should be founded?
Then, how about the problem in the sphere of‘pure phenomenology’? Our field of investigation is quite different from
that of common science. That is, the unique field of, so to speak,‘Heraclitian flux of phenomena’; or‘ever-fluxing
consciousness. How can we describe that field?
Obviously, it exists, and I can say: this here! ,
this phenomenon includes the part of that phenomenon; this
is connected to that, or this influxes into that. However, these sayings are,
if valid, only the truth in
subject. Phenomenological the field of‘pure phenomenon’ in phenomenology is inherently that
of subject. As long as the universal cognition must be seen as‘objective’, how can knowledge gained in this field be qualified as‘objective’ and‘universal’?
We may recall the distinction of perceptual
judgment and empirical judgment by Kant. (⇒ In Kant, sensation( Sinnlichkeit)
is in charge of perceptual intuition and understanding(Verstand)
integrates it
into conceptual judgment.) Although the attempt of grasping the constitution of
‘transcendence’ from the
field of‘pure phenomenon’ is
similar to Kantian attempt, there’s no idea of ‘phenomenological reduction’ in Kant. Therefore, he couldn’t fully get over the‘psychological attitude’
we defined.
In any event, what is needed here is to seek how events within subject can be anobjectively valid
judgment. Even in the case of phenomenology if it is called science, we tend to
think there must be the
ground of objective validity.
The critical question, here, is: does not objectivity carry
transcendence with it? ; does all that we call objective
cognition transcend, with no exception, the absolute certainty of immanence of consciousness? ;
what in the world does‘transcendence’ mean?, and so on.
Phenomenology, through
epistemological reduction, excludes transcendental presupposition, in order to confirm the
possibility of objective cognition. However, whatever method or right does phenomenology have
to confirm the objectivity of cognitive object? Phenomenology claims that it executes the suspension of judgment of‘transcendent
existence’ to confirm the validity of objective cognition; but as long as‘objectivity carries
transcendence with it’, in what way can phenomenology confirm the
ground of the objectivity of cognition? There seems a vicious circle which makes
the ground of phenomenology
itself impossible.
However, this circle is a spurious one. We have already seen that there
are two sets of the distinction of‘immanence’ and‘transcendence’, in which the key to break
the difficulty lay hidden.
Descartes, after
demonstrating the‘evidence of cogito’ (I
think therefore I am), questioned what gives him the essential
ground of it, then answered: clear and evident perception is that. We now understand that
significance more than Descartes. That is, in the sphere of cogitatio‘absolute givenness’
is given. Although we should reserve judgment in respect to the proof of God
and the honesty of Him, we can carry his idea of‘absolute
ground’ further.
It follows that: true we have confirmed the givenness of‘pure cogitatio’ (‘pure consciousness’ or ‘immanence’) as
indubitable, but we cannot recognize the existence of outer things in external perception.
That
means it is impossible for us to understand‘how
perception can reach the transcendence’; but we understand, on the other hand,‘how perception can
reach the immanent’ through pure and immanent
reflection. That is because we can directly and absolutely grasp what we are now perceiving and‘seeing’ in phenomenological
reflection,.
As a
whole, it is not meaningless to inquire about whether or not our subjective
cognition reaches its‘object.‘; but it is
meaningless, while‘seeing’
what is currently given to our immanence, to doubt it.
That is to say, immanent intuition which is given to us in each case
is always the most fundamental ground of our‘world experience’, and
also the most basic‘absolute evidence’ on which all of our knowledge
stands.
On the contrary,
intention or conviction of the transcendence is not really given in principle, therefore it has a necessary possibility of‘not
it’. Nevertheless, naturally, a lot of kinds of
objective cognition stand
as valid in fact; but this is of no help to refute our view point in the critique
of cognition.
3-4 The impossibility of limiting ourselves
to singular data; phenomenological cognition as cognition ofessence
Now, I would like to propose one important
question: does‘absolute self givenness’(＝absolute givenness) or
absolute evidence which we have seen appear only in an individual intuition of
this‘Da’? Or is it not given as another givenness,
namely as a certain kind of universality(⇒conception, ideal)?
No matter how important the setting up of‘absolute givenness’ in the act of consciousness is, if we confine it
just to particular intuitions (perception, memory, imagination, emotion and so
on), they are put in danger of
losing their validity. We can say that‘cogitatio’ (perception, memory or emotion) which is now existing to
me is absolutely given. However, it does not mean the proposition:‘only
givenness of reduced phenomenon as such is absolute givenness’.
Considering the whole situation, it is obvious that when we make a
proposition as a judgment in respect to the
act of consciousness (cogitationes) which is phenomenologically reflected, the judgment has already gone
beyond the immediacy of the act of consciousness. For example we may say
that: this judgment represents this or that phenomenon of perception or imagination; this
perception contains this or that aspect, color content, etc. It is the case of
a logical predication, therefore there appears not‘absolute
givenness’ itself but
something beyond absolute givenness
through particular [individual] intuition.
3-5 Ambiguity of the
conception of‘a priori’.
Thus, what should be focused on is the new
cognition:‘not only particulars, but also universals, universal objects, and universal states of affairs’
can be‘absolute self givenness’. This cognition is of decisive
importance for the possibility of phenomenology.
For the central theme of phenomenology inherently
[intrinsically] lies in‘analysis of essence’ or ‘investigation into essence’ (⇒In phenomenology essence means, more
generally,‘meaning’ or
existence of the ideal). As we
have seen, phenomenology starts from the critique of cognition; but its most important task
is setting up the science for elucidating the possibility of cognition or of
value. In this respect, phenomenology must be regarded as the science of the
general investigation of‘essence’.
Analysis of essence denotes‘general analysis’ (or analysis of species’), namely,
cognition of essence means that of the universal
or that of universal objects. To put it another way, the main sphere of phenomenology is the
science of essence of how the various kinds of the universal are given, and how
they acquire the
validity. Cognition of‘a priori’ means the
science of essence which is directed to the essence of the
universal and is elicited only from pure intuition of the universal. Here we
see the most legitimate conception of‘a priori’.
When we extend
the critique of cognition no only to the critique of theoretic reason but also
to that of practical reason, in addition to this first‘a
priori’, the objective includes‘a priori’ in the second sense. That is, the new horizon of a science will appear which seeks the
essential structure of higher meanings and
ideals such as logic, ethics or theory of value. They are generally grounded on
the basic theory of‘self givenness’.
Lecture Ⅳ (Condense )
4-1 Extension of the sphere of investigation
through a consideration of intentionality
<Summary>
What is most important to grasp the essence of cognition is to abandon
the presupposition that an ‘object‘ just exists, to consider the sphere
of ‘subject=consciousness’ alone and directly observe through inner reflection
what is taking place within it. What matters here is however not to observe
the events as they are, but to describe, as an essential relation of consciousness,
how ‘knowledge or cognition’ develops, that is, how ‘transcendence’
(validity=belief) is constituted by ‘immanence’.
We have already seen what a ‘genuine (reall)’ element is in inner consciousness.
We can also find here a structure of a ‘genuine element (cogitatio) vs.
intentional objectivity (cogitatum). It is crucial to fully analyze and
comprehend the relationship between the two moments, because by so doing
one is able to comprehend the ‘essential structure’ of knowledge.
This phenomenological investigation is therefore by no means a mere description
of individual consciousness events which come and go in the flux of experience
of consciousness. We need to make sure that what matters is instead an
examination of “essential beings” emerging in there, that is, what kind
of meaning or universal thing or structure can be uncovered there.
4-2 The self-givenness of
the universal: the philosophical method of the analysis of essence.
<Summary>
The ‘universal’, i.e., such elements as ‘meaning’,
‘concept’ and ‘idea’ necessarily emerges in our cognition. Could it be an ‘absolute givenness’ in the
same sense as ‘cogitatio’ (particular perception)?
It seems difficult to exactly define that,
unlike particular ‘seeing’ (perception), it can be ‘found in reality’ in consciousness.
Could we say then that anything like ‘meaning’ or ‘concept’ is in fact something ‘transcendent’ instead of really existing in inner
consciousness.
I would answer to this question as
follows: we might say that the ‘universal’ or ‘meaning’ is of transcendent nature
in the sense that they are not genuine elements in consciousness. What is essential for
our investigation is however what can be identified as ‘absolute givenness’, rather than whether or
not it is ‘genuine’. The ‘universal’ is
certainly not a ‘genuine’ element, but from my point of view, it is still given
to consciousness as an ‘absolute givenness’. Let us take an example.
I am now looking at a piece of red
paper. Let us observe this consciousness
by way of inner reflection. When we look
at it very carefully, the red paper is not uniformly ‘red’ over the entire
sheet, but has parts with different shades of redness. Yet I abstract the diverse shades of red and
perceive it as a piece of ‘red paper’. I
intuitively see here the ‘meaning’ of red, or ‘red in general’ as a color of
the object. This ‘red in general’ is the
“universal” mentioned above, that is, an intuition or seeing ‘given as a
meaning’. It is nothing other than ‘absolute
givenness’ originally given to my consciousness.
Let us see another example. Suppose that I am looking at a piece of dark
red paper and another piece of light red paper. I then observe that two red colors are not the same, but they are still
the same ‘red’ as a color. When I say
here ‘either of them is red’, I observe one ‘general’ thing or ‘meaning’. This is something that can be named an ‘absolute
givenness’.
The reason is as follows. This intuitive observation: “this is a piece
of red paper” or “either of them is red” (‘seeing of meaning’, or eidetic
seeing in Husserl’s “Ideas …”) is, just like the perceptive seeing of red color
itself, an ‘original intuition’ which must be accepted as it is, as further
questions like “what does this red mean, or what is its essence? make no sense
at all.
The examples mentioned above are quite simple,
and our actual ‘knowledge’ has more complicated and diverse phases. Accordingly, further in-depth examination
will be required to describe the essential structure in its entirety of ‘cognition’
in general.
No matter how complex studies it may
require, however, we should remember that the most basic principle is still the
phenomenological ‘analysis of essence’ , by which we directly observe inner
consciousness, as discussed above.
All things considered, the method of ‘phenomenological
reduction’ (=method of ideation), whose examples have been given above, is the
fundamental method of phenomenology, which alone should enable essential
critiques of knowledge and reason. Only
through this essential critique of knowledge, we shall be able to step into the
most intrinsic theme of philosophy (⇒Husserl hereby suggests the science of essence).
4-3. Critique of the interpretation of evidence
as feelings: Evidence as self-givenness:
<Summary>
As has been seen above, seeing the ‘universal’
or ‘meaning’ is also an ‘absolute givenness’. Let us call it by the name
of ‘evidence’.
Let us define ‘evidence for the time being
as a “consciousness that intuitively sees or observes its own self and directly
and fully grasps it as well, which is truly a full and complete self-givenness”. (⇒can be understood as a consciousness where live ‘meaning’ emerges in
a fulfilling way).
Philosophical empiricists once argued in
their attempt to endorse ‘something absolutely evident’ in consciousness that
live ‘feelings’ give us the notion of evidence. Phenomenological inner reflection however tells us immediately that this
is not a true-to-essence explanation.
Let us see the following example. As for the judgment 2 x 2 =4, I can vaguely
conjure it up in the form of symbolic representation, or I
can conduct an evident and positive judgment saying two times two are four. Both are logically the same ‘judgments’, but their essence is largely
distinct from each other.
The theory
of evidence as feelings mentioned above is unable to adequately explain the
difference between the two judgments. From the phenomenological point of view, the fact is that the latter judgment
explicitly observes the mathematical logic of 2x2=4, making certain of and
fulfilling its validity.
In the
former case, by contrast, I just figure the equation with a mere empty
intention.
Let us see
another example. While I one time have a
live and vivid perception of a red-colored object, on another I vaguely think
of some ‘red color’. Here again, the
essential matter is not in the difference in feelings. Phenomenologically, we can explain this in
the way that, while ‘red color’ is explicitly given to consciousness as a
particular perceptive observation in the former case, only its image (imaginary
presentation) is given in the latter case. The way an object is ‘given’ is essentially different between the two
cases, and the intensity of feelings is merely the result of this difference.
In other words, the way an ‘event’ (object)
gives itself in consciousness, that is, ‘self-givennness’ of an object
determines its ‘evidence’.
Now it should be clear to everyone that
whether or not an event is ‘evident’ depends on its ‘self-givenness’ (the way
it gives itself), but not on the feelings hanging around.
Incidentally, the question we have been
discussing is that the ‘universal’ or ‘meaning’ is given to us as a live and
direct ‘givenness’ and as an ‘evidence’. Also, we have made sure just above that the ‘universal’ (such as meaning, concept and idea) may
have absolute ‘evidence’ as much as particular seeing. This is our conclusion for the time being.
4-4 No limitation on the sphere of genuine
immanence: the theme of all self-givenness.
<Summary>
We have seen that not only particular seeing
but also the ‘seeing of meaning’ has also absolute evidence. Let us further examine what it signifies.
Suppose an example as follows. On the one hand I can talk about the feature
of ‘red color’ while actually looking at a red apple. On the other, I am able to talk about how I
feel about the red color of an apple without looking at the real apple. It means that I have here several kinds of ‘seeing
or intuition”. They are itemized as
follows.
1. Direct
perceptive intuition of ‘red color’
2. Intuition
to extract ‘meaning’ from the direct intuition of ‘red color’ (intuition of
intuition)
3. Intuition
of ‘red color’ imagined
4. Intuition
of this imaginary intuition (i.e. extracting the essence of red color from the ‘perception
of red color’ imagined
All of these
intuitions can be referred to as ‘absolute self-givenness.
Skeptics may now refute that these are all ‘self-givenness’. They will probably argue that the tuitions 2
and 4, which are to extract ‘general meaning’ are our later addition and could
not be named self-givenness.
Then let us see what will happen if they are
not ‘self-givenness’. The four intuitions
listed above are all indispensable for ascertaining the existence of
things. Lacking any one of them, we are
unable to make sure of even simple being of things. Since they are such intuitions that are by no
means arbitrarily given, that indisputably come from outside, we are able to
have knowledge or certainty of things without any
trouble. Anyway, we no doubt have criteria for distinguishing between absolute
givenness and nothing like that in our immanence. If not, we could not differentiate at all
between ‘real’ and ‘not real’, and between ‘being’ and ‘non-being.
Skeptics deny certainty altogether, but in fact, they are not suspicious
about being of things or the world. They
do not try to think about the reason for it (certainty of being of the world),
and only assert that there is no agreement between subject and object
logically.
Therefore, there is no use lecturing skeptics any longer. For no one is able to deprive skeptics of a
freedom to say they do not see what they actually see.
In any event, we can do nothing other than maintaini the notion of ‘absolute
self-giveness’ as an essential ground for validity of knowledge.
Our next important task is now to essentially identify the scope of what
we can call ‘absolute self-givenness’. (⇒ “Then the question arises
as to how far it extends and as to the extent to which, and the sense in which,
it ties itself down to the sphere of cogitationes j and the universals which
are abstracted from them.” Lecure IV of the “Idea …”)
We
have already made certain that not only particular ‘seeing’ but also the ‘universal’
seeing or seeing of ‘meaning’ are ‘self-givenness’. Since this ‘universal’ has extremely diverse
phases and forms, it is never too easy to make clear distinction in a scientific
way.
Unless
we have a thoroughgoing understanding of the essence of the method of ‘phenomenological
reduction’, we shall necessarily misjudge the extent of evidence and fall into
errors of taking transcendent for ‘immanent’.
The method is basically summarized as follows.
1. Holding fast to the notion of ‘absolute
self-givenness’
2. Inner reflecting and delineating direct ‘seeing’ and
observing ‘generic’ in there
3. Not only that, knowing there
are more objectivities, which can all be divided by ‘givenness’ (the way an
event is given), and observing, describing and appropriately classifying the
essence of this givenness.
LECTUREⅤ
5-1 The cognition of time- consciousness
5-2 Apprehension of essences as an evident givenness
of essence: the constitution of the individualessence and of
the consciousness of universality
5-3 Categorical date
5-4 The symbolically thought as such
5-5 The field of research in its widest extent: The constitution of different modes of objectivity incognition : The
problem of the correlation of cognition and the object of cognition
